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Abstract
This thesis explores how political preferences are shaped by institu-
tions, economic conditions, and personality. Each chapter is a distinct
contribution and provides a different perspective on the formation of
political preferences and, ultimately, voting behaviour. These differ-
ent approaches relate to the fields of comparative political economy,
behavioural economics, and political psychology. Methodologically,
this thesis is empirically applied and the results of these separate en-
quiries into political preferences are grounded in statistical analysis.
A first substantive chapter introduces a median voter data set that
provides insight into the ideological position of the electoral centre in
over 50 democracies. A second chapter uses this new data and stud-
ies cross-national voting behaviour in 18 Western democracies over
1960-2003. It is found that electoral behaviour is closely related to
the salience of the following economic institutions: labour organiza-
tion, skill specificity, and public sector employment. This research
shows that political preferences are endogenous to economic institu-
tions and implies the existence of institutional advantages to partisan
politics. A third substantive chapter focuses on ideological change
in the United States and tests the proposition that voters advance a
more liberal agenda in prosperous times and shift towards being more
conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility
model relates income growth to political preferences by way of the
demand for public goods and the optimal tax rate. This work thus
links voting behaviour to economic business cycles and shows that
ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates. Finally, a
fourth chapter presents the largest study to date of the influence of the
big five personality traits on political ideology. In line with prior re-
search in political psychology, it is found that openness to experience
strongly predicts liberal ideology and that conscientiousness strongly
predicts conservative ideology. A variety of childhood experiences are
also studied that may have a differential effect on political ideology
based on an individual’s personality profile. The findings of this final
chapter provide new evidence for the idea that differences in polit-
ical preferences are deeply intertwined with variation in the nature
and nurture of individual personalities. Generally, this thesis pro-
vides some new insights into the complex world of political preference
formation and does so by exploring the influential role of institutions,
economic conditions, and personality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The question of what shapes political preferences is a central and long-standing
pursuit in political science and political economy. It is also a foundational topic
because many other important research agendas in the social sciences take po-
litical preferences as a given and as a point of departure when building theory.
As such, the development of a robust and comprehensive understanding of po-
litical preference formation is an important endeavour. The resulting analysis
should inform the wider social sciences because political ideology shapes—and is
being shaped by—the socio-economic environment that we inhabit. The founda-
tional importance of understanding political preference formation was highlighted
by one of the seminal scholars in political science. In An Economic Theory of
Democracy, Anthony Downs left us the following question as a research agenda
[Downs, 1957, p. 140]:
1
What forces shape this important parameter [the aggregate distribu-
tion of preferences]? At the beginning of our study, we assumed that
voters’ tastes are fixed, which means that the voter distribution is
given. Thus we dodged the question just posed and have been evad-
ing it ever since.
Over time, the disciplines of political science, economics, sociology, and psy-
chology have all contributed to this question. As a result, political preference
formation has been studied from a multitude of perspectives and a long list of
significant influences have been obtained; including economic conditions [Duch
and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000], income and inequality [Gel-
man et al., 2008; Lupu and Pontusson, 2008; Meltzer and Richard, 1981], electoral
and economic institutions [Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009], political socialization
and voter alignment [Campbell et al., 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967], religiosity
and beliefs [Alesina and Angeletos, 2006; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Huber and
Stanig, N.d.; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006], gender [Edlund and Pande, 2002; In-
glehart and Norris, 2000; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2010], race [Luttmer, 2001],
personality [Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak et al., 2010], physiological traits [Oxley
et al., 2008], and, most recently, genetics have also been shown to influence po-
litical preference formation [Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005; Fowler, Baker and
Dawes, 2008; Settle et al., 2010].
This thesis explores how political preferences are shaped by institutions, eco-
nomic conditions, and personality. These three determinants of political ideology
2
and, ultimately, voting behaviour stand amid the many other influences that have
been exposed across literatures. Still, the original intuition that these three par-
ticular influences are also particularly important was verified over the course of
this research. This exploration of institutions, economic conditions, and person-
ality as drivers of political preference formation advances the existing literature
in a number of ways. The chapters that make up this thesis and their individual
contributions are introduced below.
Chapter 2 introduces a median voter data set that allows for comparing the
ideological position of the electoral center across time and across countries. The
data set employs the statistics provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project
but corrects for stochastic error using work by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov
[2009] and includes standard errors. This research applies the Kim and Fording
[1998] methodology that links party positions with electoral outcomes to arrive
at revealed voter preferences. This data set provides insight into the median
voter in over 50 democracies. For more established democracies the time series
typically starts in the mid 1940s. For the United States the data starts in 1920
and includes the 2008 election. A number of descriptive graphs illustrate the
major trends in voting behaviour.
Chapter 3 aims to explain cross-national voting behaviour in 18 Western
democracies over 1960-2003 and exploits the new data set for the median voter
that is introduced in the previous chapter. It is found that electoral behaviour
3
is closely related to the salience of particular economic institutions. Labour or-
ganization, skill specificity, and public sector employment are found to influence
individual voting behaviour. At the country level, this chapter suggests that co-
ordinated market economies move the median voter to the left, whereas liberal
market economies move the median voter to the right. The empirical analysis
employs cross-sectional and panel data that are instrumented with the level of
economic structure circa 1900 to estimate the net effect of economic institutions
on the median voter. Significant results show that revealed voter preferences are
endogenous to the economic institutions of the political economy. This chapter
places political economy at the heart of voting behaviour and implies the existence
of institutional advantages to partisan politics.
Chapter 4 tests the proposition that voters advance a more liberal agenda
in prosperous times and shift towards being more conservative in dire economic
times. A reference-dependent utility model links income growth to voting be-
haviour by way of the demand for public goods and the optimal tax rate. With
income growth, the relative demand for public goods increases and the median
voter can afford more taxation, as a result the median voter is more likely to vote
Democrat. With less income growth, the median voter derives increased marginal
utility from personal income—making taxation more painful—and is more likely
to vote Republican. Ordinary and instrumented statistical analyses of the new
median voter data for the US median voter are encouraging of the income growth
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model. This work links voting behaviour to economic business cycles and shows
that ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates.
Chapter 5 presents the largest study to date on the influence of the “big
five” personality traits on political ideology using a US representative sample. In
line with research in political psychology, “openness to experience” is found to
strongly predict liberal ideology and “conscientiousness” strongly predicts con-
servative ideology. The availability of sibling clusters in the data is leveraged to
show that these results are also robust to the inclusion of family fixed effects.
A variety of childhood experiences are also studied that may have a direct ef-
fect on political ideology as well as a differential effect based on a respondent’s
personality profile. Childhood trauma is found to interact with “openness” in
predicting ideology and this triangular relationship is further explored using me-
diation analysis. The findings of this chapter provide new evidence for the idea
that differences in political ideology are deeply intertwined with variation in the
nature and nurture of individual personalities.
Each chapter is a distinct contribution and provides a different perspective
on the formation of political preferences. These different approaches relate to
the fields of comparative political economy, behavioural economics, and political
psychology. Taken together, these perspectives provide some new insights into
the complex world of political preference formation and do so by exploring the
role of institutions, economic conditions, and personality.
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Chapter 2
The Median Voter Data Set:
Voter Preferences across 50
Democracies
2.1 Introduction
The work by Black [1948] and Downs [1957] introduced the concept of the median
voter or the ideological position of the electoral center. The intuition behind the
importance of the median voter existed prior in the writings of French mathe-
matician Condorcet [1785] and the economist Hotelling [1929]. Condorcet first
described the existence of a pivotal voter and Hotelling theorized on how eco-
nomic agents move to capture the interests that lie at the center of a spatial
market. Still, it took Downs’ seminal An Economic Theory of Democracy and
his work on the median voter theorem for it to become a central topic in Political
Science and Political Economy. While the theorem pertains to majority elections
6
only and relies on a number of assumptions, the notion of an electoral center
has general usage. As such, the median voter has come to figure widely across
literatures but often lacked adequate data to support theoretical arguments.
Attempts at distilling quantitative data on ideology have typically relied on
surveys that gauge political opinions (American National Election Studies, Euro-
barometer) or on expert surveys [Castles and Mair, 1984]. Unfortunately, survey
data are not readily available prior to 1970 and would be difficult to reconstruct.
Most survey data also does not lend itself easily for comparison across countries
and across time.1 Given the limitations of survey data, the indicator for voter
preferences that has gained widespread usage is the Kim and Fording [1998, 2003]
measure for the median voter. Kim and Fording developed their measure in con-
junction with the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) by Budge et al. [2001]
and Klingemann et al. [2006]. Essentially, the position of the median voter is
computed from vote shares for the ideologically ranked parties. The strength of
the Kim-Fording measure stems from the fact that it is a CMP-based measure
and hence builds on its detail and comprehensiveness. This measure of voter
preferences allows for comparison across countries and across time. As compared
to self-placement surveys, this methodology also ties in actual voting behaviour
1It is worthwhile pointing out that the Eurobarometer survey consistently asks its respon-
dents to self-place on a left-right scale. Regrettably for cross-national analysis, self-placement
on the left and right scale revolves around what constitutes the center for the respondent. Be-
cause notions of the political center vary quite dramatically across countries, the self-placement
left-right survey data is of little value in cross-national studies.
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which leaves opinion polling data more appropriately coined as “median citizen”
instead of “median voter”[Warwick, 2009]. Usage of the Kim-Fording measure
is increasingly widespread and includes work by McDonald and Budge [2005],
Markussen [2008], Adams and Somer-Topcu [2006], Bartels [2008b], and Pontus-
son and Rueda [forthcoming].
At the same time, however, the underlying CMP data is increasingly subject
to criticism. Most criticism centers on errors in CMP measurement because of
the stochastic features of manifesto generation and manifesto coding processes.
Recent contributions on the limits of the CMP include Benoit and Laver [2007],
Edwards [2006], Hans and Ho¨nnige [2008], Mikhaylov, Benoit and Laver [2008],
and Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009].
This research note introduces a new, updated, and improved median voter
data set that includes estimates of standard errors. It uses CMP statistics on
party positions that are corrected for stochastic error by building on the work
by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] and employs a subtractive methodology
to arrive at a user-friendly range for left-right voter preferences. The results are
compared with the Kim-Fording statistics in Table 2.1 and represented in Figure
2.1. Following the methodological part of the paper, a number of descriptive
graphs illustrate the remarkable evolution of ideological change. The general
trends are presented for the more established democracies, with a particular focus
on the US given the unique longitudinal data made available here (1920-2008).
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2.2 Methodology
This research employs the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data set devel-
oped by Budge et al. [2001] and Klingemann et al. [2006]. The CMP codified all
sentences of every election manifesto to place parties on a left-right scale.1 This
paper co-opts the subtractive method to quantify the ideological position of a
party manifesto on the left-right scale, as used in the work by the CMP authors.2
The scaling consists in subtracting the sum of percentage references to categories
grouped as left from the sum of percentage references to categories grouped as
right:
IDParty =
∑
Pro-right Categories -
∑
Pro-left Categories
The manifesto data is collected such that each statement is assigned to either a
pro-left or a pro-right category. Consequently, negative scores represent a gener-
1Policy preferences associated with the left are: Regulation of capitalism, Economic Plan-
ning, Protectionism, Controlled economy, Nationalization, Decolonization, Peace, Internation-
alism, Democracy, Social services expansion, Education, and labour groups. Rightist categories
are: Free enterprise, Incentives, Economic orthodoxy and efficiency, Social services reduction,
Constitutionalism, Government effectiveness and authority, National way of life, Traditional
morality, Law and order, National effort and social harmony, Military, and Freedom and do-
mestic human rights.
2Kim and Fording [1998, 2003] deviate from the CMP method to calculate the measure
of party ideology. Instead of using the subtractive measure they construct the following ratio
measure:
IDleft =
∑
Pro-left Categories
IDright =
∑
Pro-right Categories
IDParty = IDleft−IDrightIDleft+IDright
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ally left position, whereas positive scores are reflective of a right position.1 Results
range between -100 (extreme left) and +100 (extreme right).
As noted, the CMP data set is not without its critics. Benoit and Laver [2007],
Edwards [2006], Hans and Ho¨nnige [2008], Mikhaylov, Benoit and Laver [2008],
and Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] have critiqued the CMP for the absence
of estimates of measurement uncertainty. Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009]
detail the inherently stochastic processes of text generation and text coding for
which the CMP does not provide error estimates. Manifesto generation allows
for variation in texts that are not accounted for in the CMP measures. In fact,
CMP measures treat as identical manifestos of different length even though some
texts are a lot more informative than others. The human interpretative coding
of CMP manifestos also leads to measurement uncertainty as the text coding is
not carried out by a single coder.
The absence of estimates of measurement uncertainty in the CMP data in view
of manifesto authorship and coding is troublesome and lowers the scientific quality
of its statistics as well as the research that builds upon it. Treating words as data
with error, Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] proceed by bootstrapping the
analysis of every coded manifesto. By way of these simulations they reconstruct
the stochastic processes that generated these political texts. In doing so they are
1Given the broad definition of left-right partisanship that these CMP categories entail, Kim
and Fording [2001] also referred to this metric as the degree of conservatism.
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able to estimate degrees of non-systematic error for the thousands of manifestos
coded by the CMP. The use of these error estimates allows for better empirical
and theoretical inferences from the CMP data. The importance of correcting for
measurement error in the CMP data cannot be overstated. In their piece, Benoit,
Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] re-run two prominent studies that have used CMP
data without accounting for measurement error. The results of these replications
show that the corrected models by Hix, Noury and Roland [2006] and Adams
et al. [2006] produce different implications than their authors originally claimed.
The bootstrapping work by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] also allows for
generating new data estimates of party policy positions. The alternative estimate
for a party policy position then becomes the mean estimator of the bootstrap
simulations that were drawn for each manifesto. These new data for party policy
positions calibrates for stochastic error in the CMP.1
This paper makes use of these new and corrected party policy positions. By
linking this data to electoral results using the Kim-Fording methodology [Kim
and Fording, 1998, 2003] we arrive at statistical measures for revealed voter pref-
erences. The position of the median voter is computed from vote shares for the
ideologically ranked parties. This is done by first ranking the parties by ideo-
logical score for every election in each country. Then for each party the interval
1The Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] data set with CMP statistics, uncertainty mea-
sures, and bootstrapping mean estimators (“rilemean”) for party positions are available at
http://www.kenbenoit.net/.
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where its supporters are located is tabulated by locating the midpoints between
the ideologically neighboring parties. Assuming that voters choose the candidate
or party that is ideologically closest to them, a party will attract the votes of
those that are part of the interval that surrounds that party. The assumption
that voting behaviour is an expression of preferences or beliefs is common [Coate
and Conlin, 2004; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009]. Still, it is important to
underscore that this assumption implies a disregard of the part of the electorate
that may vote strategically rather than ideologically.1 Finally, the electoral re-
sults for each party at every election are matched to produce the percentage of
the electorate that is grouped into each ideological interval.2
As Kim and Fording [2003: 96] point out, their method requires us “to con-
ceive of elections as large-scale opinion polls.” Where the ballot acts as a survey
in which subject chooses the party that is ideologically closest on the partisan
left-right spectrum. As such, it is possible to treat election results as a grouped
frequency distribution and tabulate a median statistic. In line with the Kim-
Fording method, the median position is calculated using the following formula:
M = L+ 50−C
F
∗W
1Stevenson [2001] notes that estimates of the importance of strategic voting rarely attain
10%.
2The data on electoral results is available from the CMP publications [Budge et al., 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006]. The electoral data entries had to be standardized because the electoral
results do not always add up to a 100.
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where:
M = Median voter (ideological score)
L = Lower end of the interval containing the median.
C = Cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval
containing the median.
F = Frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median.
W = Width of the interval containing the median.
To illustrate the Kim-Fording method with a fictitious example, consider an
election for a country with 4 parties. Coding of the manifestos places Party A
at -60 on the left-right scale running from -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme
right) and Parties B, C, and D at, respectively, -10, 20, and 50. Having ranked
party policy positions we can now tabulate the ideological intervals surrounding
each party to which their voters belong given the assumption that voters choose
the party that is ideologically closest on the partisan left-right spectrum. The
first ideological interval that provides the support for Party A thus runs from -100
to -35. The second interval groups voters that fall within the -35 to +5 group and
will provide electoral support for Party B. Intervals +5 to +35 and +35 to +100
group voters for Parties C and D. Next, we match the electoral results to each
ideological interval. For example, Party A obtained 10% of the vote and Parties
B, C, and D obtained, respectively, 40%, 30%, and 20%. The resulting grouped
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frequency distribution allows for the tabulation of a median statistics. Applying
the Kim-Fording method to this example we obtain a median voter position of
7.14. The ideological centre of this fictitious country at the time of this election
would thus be centre-right or conservative.1
Figure 2.1 shows the resulting left-right positions of 53 democracies averaged
over their respective periods for which data is available. The horizontal bars
represent standard errors. The data ranges between -100 (extreme left) and +100
(extreme right).
Among the more established democracies, in line with conventional wisdom
the most left-leaning states have been Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Luxem-
bourg. On the other end of the ideological spectrum are Switzerland, the United
States, Israel, Turkey, and Iceland. With more recent democracies, for which
less data is available, such as Russia and the central and eastern european coun-
tries we note a tendency to gravitate towards the more conservative end of the
left-right spectrum. Also of interest is the degree to which countries exhibit ide-
ological stability over their respective time series. Table 2.1 reports the standard
deviations for this set of 53 democracies and provides insight into the magnitudes
1The Kim-Fording measure allows for tabulating a median statistic. However, what the
Kim-Fording measure does not capture, for example, is the degree of ideological polarization
in an election. Party positions could lie close to each other or wide apart but the resulting
median statistic could well be the same. Moreover, the median voter statistic may not capture
important changes in the underlying preferences of the voter. While the measure will capture
the evolution of the median voter over time it may not capture important changes happening
on either side of the median statistic.
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Left-right median voter position (with Std. Error)
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Figure 2.1: The Median Voter (average for available time series by country)
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of ideological shifts. Among established democracies, the countries with least
ideological movement have been Canada, Norway, the United States, and New
Zealand. In contrast, the countries that showed most ideological instability are
Turkey, Iceland, and Sweden.
2.3 Comparison
While notoriously difficult to demonstrate the validity of a measure of voter pref-
erences given the lack of a universally accepted benchmark, Kim and Fording
[1998, 2001, 2003] perform a number of validity tests with other indicators of
voter preferences (convergent validity) and checks with related empirical and the-
oretical work (face validity). The methodology to construct these median voter
statistics also underwent robustness checks carried out by, among others, Pow-
ell [2000] and McDonald and Budge [2005]. The results are consistent and lend
credibility to their methodology and assumptions. Here it may suffice to com-
pare the Kim-Fording data with the data set that is introduced in this paper.1
Table 2.1 presents the country estimates for the median voter averaged over the
1The most recent Kim-Fording data is available on the website of HeeMin Kim and incor-
porates the CMP data of Mapping Policy Preferences II [Klingemann et al., 2006]. Their data
set ranges from 0 to +100 (with left being > 50 and right being < 50). In order to compare
and bring their data to the -100 (left) to +100 (right) scale used in this paper, the following
tabulation was performed:
(x− 50)*−2
The Kim-Fording data is available at http://heeminkimfsu.googlepages.com/
datasetsandsolutionconceptsicreated (accessed on 28 October 2009).
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available data for both the Kim-Fording estimates and the new data introduced
here. Standard errors and standard deviations are given for the new data set, the
Kim-Fording statistics do not offer standard errors.
Table 2.1: Comparative analysis of the Median Voter
data.
Country from Kim-Fording De Neve Std. error Std. dev
United States 19201 7.8 6.8 2.2 18.9
European Union
Austria 1949 2.7 2.8 4.7 16.2
Belgium 1946 -2.8 -2.9 3.0 10.1
Bulgaria 1990 10.9 8.9 4.0 12.7
Croatia 1990 18.5 19.8 5.0 16.3
Cyprus 1996 -6.5 -7.2 1.4 6.9
Czech Rep. 1990 6.4 7.6 4.6 9.3
Denmark 1945 -3.2 -3.0 6.4 9.7
Estonia 1992 2.6 4.0 5.9 4.8
Finland 1945 -10.5 -10.7 6.3 12.8
Continued on next page
1The Kim-Fording data has time series for the US from 1948 until 2000. This data set offers
time series for the US from 1920 to 2008.
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Country from Kim-Fording De Neve Std. error Std. dev
France 1946 0.2 -1.3 5.7 11.8
Germany 1949 -0.3 -0.3 5.2 10.8
Great Britain 1945 -6.4 -7.1 3.0 14.7
Greece 1974 -0.5 -0.4 2.8 10.6
Hungary 1990 5.6 6.8 4.6 4.4
Ireland 1948 2.8 2.7 6.3 14.2
Italy 1946 -1.4 -0.9 3.7 10.9
Latvia 1993 6.3 7.2 8.1 7.3
Lithuania 1992 12.3 12.4 4.9 18.1
Luxembourg 1945 -13.6 -13.6 4.4 10.0
Malta 1996 -15.6 1.3 1.8 20.1
Netherlands 1946 -5.0 -5.2 3.2 11.1
Nth. Ireland 1921 n/a -4.6 6.7 19.6
Poland 1991 7.2 3.7 6.6 11.6
Portugal 1975 -2.0 -2.0 4.6 21.1
Romania 1990 -2.8 -8.7 5.4 12.7
Slovakia 1990 4.7 4.7 4.0 10.1
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Country from Kim-Fording De Neve Std. error Std. dev
Slovenia 1990 0.1 0.3 6.0 5.9
Spain 1977 -11.2 -9.3 2.6 8.4
Sweden 1944 -15.6 -18.7 6.3 18.4
Other
Albania 1991 1.8 10.9 4.0 5.7
Armenia 1995 2.3 6.3 6.9 7.3
Australia 1946 7.1 7.0 4.2 12.6
Azerbaijan 1995 11.9 12.1 9.5 3.8
Belarus 1995 n/a 1.2 5.6 n/a
Bosnia-Herz. 1990 28.2 23.2 6.1 19.7
Canada 1945 -1.7 -1.7 5.3 6.9
Georgia 1995 9.0 14.3 6.9 15.4
Iceland 1946 12.0 11.8 6.9 19.1
Israel 1949 7.6 8.5 10.8 9.1
Japan 1960 -9.0 -9.4 6.5 12.9
Mexico 1946 n/a 3.4 3.1 13.2
Moldova 1994 3.6 3.6 3.5 n/a
Continued on next page
19
Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Country from Kim-Fording De Neve Std. error Std. dev
Montenegro 1990 4.9 7.7 4.4 4.7
New Zealand 1946 -8.7 -8.5 4.3 10.5
Norway 1945 -22.9 -21.4 2.9 7.0
Russia 1993 18.8 18.5 4.9 19.4
Serbia 1990 19.8 21.3 4.9 15.8
Sri Lanka 1947 n/a -13.0 3.9 6.5
Switzerland 1947 6.7 7.7 5.0 8.8
Turkey 1950 11.2 11.3 2.9 16.5
Note: Table shows the median voter average for available time series by
country. The median voter data ranges between -100 (extreme left) and +100
(extreme right).
Generally, the estimates are similar enough to argue consistency (r=0.93), yet
sufficiently different to warrant claiming a novel data set. The bootstrapping
work by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] allowed for the inclusion of mea-
surement error with this new median voter data, a welcome addition that should
prove useful for future econometric studies. Next, this paper presents a num-
ber of descriptive figures of the new median voter data set for more established
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democracies that may shed light on important debates in political science and
political economy. Ideological change in the US is detailed thereafter.
2.4 Ideological change
Figure 2.2 shows the general evolution of voter preferences for 25 Western democ-
racies for which data was available since 1950 (weighted by population). In line
with conventional wisdom, there is a strong ideological shift towards the left that
starts in the late 1950s and culminates around 1968. The 1970s, however, see an
equally powerful return shift in ideology that becomes increasingly conservative
or rightist as we enter the 1980s and 1990s. While every country has its unique
ideological flavor, it is equally clear that there is a pervasive sense of co-variance
across Western democracies. The broad ideological shifts appear to be general
in nature. Stevenson [2001], Markussen [2008], and Kayser [2009] argue that
the electoral success of left and right politics move in “partisan waves” that are
partially shaped by international business cycles.
Given the importance of electoral systems and economic institutions, it could
also be of interest to present how variation among countries interacts with voter
preferences. Figure 2.3 splits the sample of 25 Western democracies by either
majoritarian or proportional representation systems. A clear-cut ideological di-
vergence only starts in the early 1970s when the voters in majoritarian electoral
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Figure 2.2: Average Voter Preferences in 25 Western Democracies (1950-2004)
systems make a pronounced shift towards the conservative right. The voting pub-
lic in democracies with P.R. systems catches up slowly yet remains leftist until
the mid-1990s.
Figure 2.4 looks into how countries with different clusters of economic insti-
tutions interact with voter preferences. Perhaps the most appropriate way in
differentiating between political economies is to distinguish coordinated market
economies (CMEs) from liberal market economies (LMEs) as suggested by Hall
and Soskice [2001] in Varieties of Capitalism.1
1Hall and Soskice [2001] propose a distinction between two clusters of capitalist economies
on the basis of the means that firms and other actors use to coordinate their actions across the
political economy. Hall and Soskice (2001: 20) describe and list CMEs (e.g. Sweden, Austria,
Germany) and LMEs (e.g. USA, UK, Australia).
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Figure 2.3: Voter preferences in 25 Western democracies split by majoritarian
and P.R. electoral systems (1950-2000)
Categorizing this set of democracies by cluster of economic institutions instead
of electoral system leads to a more pronounced and sustained split with regards
to voter preferences.1 While there are common ideological trends across democ-
racies, voter preferences would appear to be mediated by varieties of economic
and electoral systems.
1De Neve [2009a] finds that voter preferences are closely related to the salience of particular
economic institutions. Labour organization, skill specificity, and public sector employment are
found to influence individual voting behaviour. At the country level, his reasoning suggests
that coordinated market economies move the median voter to the left, whereas liberal market
economies move the median voter to the right. An instrumented empirical analysis estimates
the net effect of economic institutions on the median voter. Significant results indicate that
revealed voter preferences are endogenous to the economic institutions of the political economy.
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Figure 2.4: Voter preferences in 25 Western democracies split by Liberal and
Coordinated Market Economies (1950-2000)
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2.5 The United States, 1920-2008
For the United States only, the election documents going back as far as 1920
have been coded. Moreover, a special effort was made to code the most recent
2008 election documents.1 The result is a unique view of the evolution of voter
preferences in the United States as shown in Figure 2.5. The American National
Election Studies (ANES) party self-identification measure2 is added on from when
it became available (1952), as well as a polynomial trend line to show the general
trend in voting behaviour between 1920 and 2008 in the US.
In line with conventional wisdom it shows the US to be generally rightist or
conservative. The one time that the US public enters leftist territory is between
1945-50 when, in the wake of the Roosevelt years, Truman finds fertile ground to
introduce the Fair Deal that implements a large number of social and economic
reforms; including the Housing Act of 1949, an expansion of social security, as
well as the first call for universal healthcare. On the international front this less
conservative period shows in the large economic aid programs as symbolized by
the Marshall Plan. Soon thereafter, however, the US gradually returns to being
increasingly more conservative with support for Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and
Bush Sr. The elections of Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter do not indicate a turn-
ing of the ideological tide though the Kennedy to Johnson and Carter years show
1Ian Budge and Judith Bara are to be thanked for their efforts and approval of early release.
2The ANES measure of party identification is a bi-annual survey that gauges whether
respondents think of themselves as Democrat, Independent, or Republican on a 7-point scale.
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Figure 2.5: The US Median Voter, 1920-2008
26
a softening conservatism. The mid-eighties see another quantum leap in the con-
servatism of the American public and culminates with the electoral victory of Bill
Clinton who rode the conservative wave on a platform that heralded “the era of
big government is over” and promoted fiscal conservatism. The conservativeness
of the US electorate drops slightly throughout the second term of the Clinton
years and the 2000 election of Bush Jr. However, towards the 2004 re-election of
Bush Jr., we note an upswing in conservatism that gradually peels off when we
head for the Obama presidency. 1
Of course, in order to measure ideological change in the US one could simply
take the variation in electoral success between Democrat and Republican candi-
dates over time. To do so, however, would be a mistake as it would falsely assume
that the ideological position of either party has not altered over time. Combin-
ing electoral success with an in-depth analysis of party documents since 1920
allows for a sophisticated measure of voting behaviour and ideological change
that incorporates voter and party dynamics.
1What drives these changes in voter sentiment? Durr [1993] and De Neve [2009b] build
empirical arguments to claim that these broad shifts in ideological sentiment represent responses
to changing economic conditions.
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2.6 Conclusion
This research note built upon the CMP bootstrapping work done by Benoit, Laver
and Mikhaylov [2009] and applied the Kim-Fording [1998, 2003] methodology to
arrive at a new data set for the median voter. The new data set distinguishes
itself by (i) employing party positions corrected for stochastic error; (ii) producing
standard errors; and (iii) updating previous median voter statistics. The data is
reproduced in the appendix and will be continuously updated online as new data
becomes available.
It is important to highlight the fact that the median voter statistics are derived
indirectly via party policy positions and their success at the election polls, and
not from direct evidence of voter opinions. However, as noted by Pontusson
and Rueda (2008: 13), “it seems quite accurate to think of the position of the
median voter as being constructed by parties in competition with each other.”
Furthermore, given the inherent difficulties in employing survey data for cross-
national and historic analyses of voter preferences, these median voter data may
be a reasonable alternative. First, historic survey data may not be available
for a number of countries. Second, left-right self-placement may not allow for
cross-national analysis as subjective notions of the political center vary quite
dramatically across countries. Finally, as explained in McDonald and Budge
[2005] “an additional problem with relying on survey data to measure citizens’
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ideologies is that strong evidence exists that citizens’ Left-Right self-placements
are subject to assimilation effects, that is, that citizens tend to place themselves
unduly close to parties they like for non-policy-related reasons.” Empirical issues
such as the above may make the use of public opinion polling often inadequate
and, hence, the possible usefulness of the median voter data introduced here.
Two important descriptive inferences are made from evaluating the median
voter data. First, countries exhibit very different ideological positions over time.
Among established democracies, the voting public of the US, Iceland, Israel,
Switzerland and Turkey displayed conservative or rightist political views. On
the other hand, the Scandinavian societies showed a far greater preference for
leftist policies. Second, while countries exhibit different ideological flavors, one
can distinguish general trends in ideological movement that appear common to
the majority of Western democracies and may be mediated by economic and
electoral systems. This would indicate that change in voter preferences travels
across borders and among varieties of economic and electoral systems.
This new data set for the median voter lends itself to a wide range of em-
pirical research in political economy and political science, and is of use to both
cross-national and within country analyses. Scholars interested in the power of
ideas will find use for these time series on revealed political preferences. Scholars
working on representation will be interested in linking up these voter preferences
with the ideological make-up of government and policy output. Scholars of inter-
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national political economy with interests in trade or macroeconomic performance
will be advised to look into how voter preferences may influence economic out-
comes. Finally, this data provides fertile ground for future research on exploring
these important cross-national left-right patterns.
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2.7 Appendix: data
Country Election Median voter Std error Country Election Median voter Std error
United States 2-Nov-20 20.88 3.68 Bulgaria 10-Jun-90 21.80 6.71
United States 4-Nov-24 8.28 3.04 Bulgaria 13-Oct-91 8.67 4.86
United States 6-Nov-28 5.49 2.88 Bulgaria 18-Oct-94 3.07 2.90
United States 8-Nov-32 7.18 4.21 Bulgaria 19-Apr-97 25.70 3.17
United States 3-Nov-36 6.06 3.10 Bulgaria 18-Jun-01 -4.50 2.25
United States 5-Nov-40 0.16 3.47 Croatia 22-Apr-90 2.12 4.55
United States 7-Nov-44 5.02 3.86 Croatia 2-Aug-92 22.93 5.48
United States 2-Nov-48 -7.67 5.33 Croatia 29-Oct-95 34.29 5.12
United States 4-Nov-52 1.38 2.86 Cyprus 26-May-96 -2.32 1.56
United States 6-Nov-56 10.05 2.08 Cyprus 27-May-01 -12.05 1.19
United States 8-Nov-60 12.79 1.82 Czech Rep. 9-Jun-90 18.52 6.20
United States 3-Nov-64 0.54 2.09 Czech Rep. 6-Jun-92 15.39 3.01
United States 5-Nov-68 2.72 2.11 Czech Rep. 31-May-96 7.18 4.89
United States 7-Nov-72 9.57 1.37 Czech Rep. 19-Jun-98 -0.32 4.65
United States 2-Nov-76 5.76 1.45 Czech Rep. 14-Jun-02 -2.56 4.31
United States 4-Nov-80 0.61 1.04 Denmark 30-Oct-45 -16.51 5.67
United States 6-Nov-84 9.18 4.69 Denmark 28-Oct-47 -3.99 5.94
United States 8-Nov-88 10.31 2.76 Denmark 5-Sep-50 2.79 9.31
United States 3-Nov-92 20.32 2.15 Denmark 21-Apr-53 -2.85 7.06
United States 5-Nov-96 16.38 1.71 Denmark 22-Sep-53 -0.77 6.42
United States 7-Nov-00 14.83 1.50 Denmark 14-May-57 3.81 8.74
United States 2-Nov-04 19.73 1.65 Denmark 15-Nov-60 -20.85 4.11
United States 4-Nov-08 16.95 1.55 Denmark 22-Sep-64 -15.14 3.64
European Union Denmark 22-Nov-66 -3.73 5.50
Austria 9-Oct-49 12.11 8.45 Denmark 23-Jan-68 -4.36 5.98
Austria 22-Feb-53 0.91 7.14 Denmark 21-Sep-71 -4.45 5.54
Austria 13-May-56 12.60 13.45 Denmark 4-Dec-73 9.09 5.47
Austria 10-May-59 11.82 4.84 Denmark 9-Jan-75 10.40 5.88
Austria 18-Nov-62 -2.52 9.37 Denmark 15-Feb-77 -2.98 8.06
Austria 6-Mar-66 -3.56 2.75 Denmark 23-Oct-79 1.23 9.17
Austria 1-Mar-70 -39.76 5.19 Denmark 8-Dec-81 -0.77 3.71
Austria 10-Oct-71 10.11 3.26 Denmark 10-Jan-84 -10.35 4.33
Austria 5-Oct-75 14.97 3.99 Denmark 8-Sep-87 -23.00 5.75
Austria 6-May-79 -10.13 3.43 Denmark 10-May-88 -1.60 5.27
Austria 24-Apr-83 -9.83 2.77 Denmark 12-Dec-90 -7.07 7.34
Austria 23-Nov-86 -3.50 3.27 Denmark 21-Sep-94 -2.39 10.14
Austria 7-Oct-90 -1.17 2.08 Denmark 11-Mar-98 6.36 5.68
Austria 9-Oct-94 19.07 1.66 Denmark 20-Nov-01 17.14 8.55
Austria 17-Dec-95 34.64 3.22 Estonia 20-Sep-92 8.97 5.25
Austria 3-Oct-99 10.14 2.94 Estonia 5-Mar-95 6.85 4.11
Austria 24-Nov-02 -7.75 1.69 Estonia 7-Mar-99 -1.48 9.80
Belgium 17-Feb-46 23.10 4.88 Estonia 2-Mar-03 1.54 4.38
Belgium 29-Jun-49 -10.15 2.65 Finland 18-Mar-45 3.81 5.87
Belgium 4-Jun-50 -1.54 3.17 Finland 2-Jul-48 1.85 5.13
Belgium 11-Apr-54 5.61 1.56 Finland 3-Jul-51 6.61 7.09
Belgium 1-Jun-58 -8.99 3.20 Finland 8-Mar-54 -19.71 3.75
Belgium 26-Mar-61 -12.18 4.44 Finland 7-Jul-58 -13.82 4.33
Belgium 23-May-65 -9.60 3.81 Finland 5-Feb-62 -1.75 5.63
Belgium 31-Mar-68 0.77 2.86 Finland 21-Mar-66 -13.26 5.41
Belgium 7-Nov-71 -19.97 5.27 Finland 16-Mar-70 -21.85 5.80
Belgium 10-Mar-74 -13.66 2.04 Finland 3-Jan-72 -3.41 7.54
Belgium 17-Apr-77 -5.64 3.42 Finland 22-Sep-75 -30.73 8.04
Belgium 17-Dec-78 1.15 2.55 Finland 13-Mar-79 -26.95 12.82
Belgium 8-Nov-81 1.27 1.84 Finland 21-Mar-83 -16.58 11.94
Belgium 13-Oct-85 14.19 3.15 Finland 16-Mar-87 -33.41 4.48
Belgium 13-Dec-87 -3.24 3.67 Finland 17-Mar-91 -0.99 6.31
Belgium 24-Nov-91 -4.53 2.68 Finland 19-Mar-95 0.61 4.58
Belgium 21-May-95 -3.75 1.82 Finland 21-Mar-99 1.21 5.49
Belgium 13-Jun-99 -5.31 1.26 Finland 16-Mar-03 -13.43 2.55
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Country Election Median voter Std error Country Election Median voter Std error
France 10-Nov-46 26.31 4.01 Hungary 25-Mar-90 6.91 5.75
France 17-Jun-51 19.44 6.96 Hungary 8-May-94 11.91 4.60
France 2-Jan-56 0.79 6.28 Hungary 10-May-98 7.43 3.22
France 23-Nov-58 1.16 5.21 Hungary 7-Apr-02 1.13 5.01
France 18-Nov-62 -2.48 5.65 Ireland 4-Feb-48 -10.07 6.80
France 5-Mar-67 -7.89 6.07 Ireland 30-May-51 -10.39 7.37
France 23-Jun-68 -5.38 9.00 Ireland 18-Apr-54 16.94 9.94
France 4-Mar-73 -18.45 3.90 Ireland 5-Mar-57 40.10 9.50
France 12-Mar-78 -12.07 5.14 Ireland 4-Oct-61 20.93 11.27
France 14-Jun-81 -11.37 7.54 Ireland 7-Apr-65 -5.86 5.89
France 16-Mar-86 5.80 7.16 Ireland 16-Jun-69 11.46 5.12
France 5-Jun-88 0.07 5.62 Ireland 28-Feb-73 15.90 9.29
France 21-Mar-93 -6.94 4.86 Ireland 16-Jun-77 -0.70 2.70
France 25-May-97 1.64 5.08 Ireland 11-Jun-81 1.47 5.79
France 9-Jun-02 -10.54 3.35 Ireland 18-Feb-82 -0.84 12.38
Germany 14-Aug-49 -13.21 6.70 Ireland 24-Nov-82 -12.48 8.65
Germany 6-Sep-53 -7.44 8.06 Ireland 17-Feb-87 -5.87 1.92
Germany 15-Sep-57 29.88 10.14 Ireland 15-Jun-89 -9.48 1.40
Germany 17-Sep-61 -0.75 8.64 Ireland 25-Nov-92 -1.28 4.28
Germany 19-Sep-65 -2.96 3.83 Ireland 6-Jun-97 4.44 1.54
Germany 28-Sep-69 -7.87 7.69 Ireland 17-May-02 -8.08 2.71
Germany 19-Nov-72 -3.15 3.77 Italy 2-Jun-46 -11.33 9.14
Germany 30-Oct-76 2.59 5.42 Italy 18-Apr-48 6.21 6.30
Germany 9-Oct-80 -1.88 3.25 Italy 7-Jun-53 -10.18 7.22
Germany 6-Mar-83 14.64 5.16 Italy 25-May-58 -12.53 4.25
Germany 25-Jan-87 -0.87 2.83 Italy 28-Apr-63 -13.13 1.96
Germany 2-Dec-90 -11.01 4.12 Italy 19-May-68 -12.12 4.83
Germany 16-Oct-94 -7.59 2.06 Italy 7-May-72 -5.54 2.36
Germany 27-Sep-98 0.42 4.09 Italy 20-Jun-76 0.38 3.12
Germany 22-Sep-02 5.29 2.55 Italy 3-Jun-79 -8.33 2.59
Great Britain 5-Jul-45 18.76 2.66 Italy 26-Jun-83 -4.44 1.80
Great Britain 23-Feb-50 -12.18 2.39 Italy 14-Jun-87 4.85 2.40
Great Britain 25-Oct-51 -13.21 4.50 Italy 6-Apr-92 8.68 2.26
Great Britain 26-May-55 -33.39 2.81 Italy 28-Mar-94 8.38 1.84
Great Britain 8-Oct-59 -23.95 2.58 Italy 21-Apr-96 17.16 3.96
Great Britain 15-Oct-64 -17.80 3.53 Italy 13-May-01 18.56 1.55
Great Britain 31-Mar-66 -12.48 2.37 Latvia 5-Jun-93 17.74 8.85
Great Britain 18-Jun-70 4.64 5.79 Latvia 30-Sep-95 6.55 13.88
Great Britain 28-Feb-74 -23.52 2.34 Latvia 3-Oct-98 3.13 1.82
Great Britain 10-Oct-74 -4.42 2.66 Latvia 5-Nov-02 1.39 7.84
Great Britain 3-May-79 -3.44 3.85 Lithuania 25-Oct-92 29.57 9.01
Great Britain 9-Jun-83 0.98 2.11 Lithuania 20-Oct-96 14.22 3.08
Great Britain 11-Jun-87 5.59 2.08 Lithuania 8-Oct-00 -6.55 2.58
Great Britain 9-Apr-92 -19.51 2.44 Luxembourg 21-Oct-45 5.21 7.47
Great Britain 1-May-97 12.41 2.88 Luxembourg 6-Jun-48 -21.17 10.51
Great Britain 7-Jun-01 7.65 2.64 Luxembourg 3-Jun-51 -2.63 6.64
Greece 17-Nov-74 -0.59 3.90 Luxembourg 30-May-54 -9.11 13.04
Greece 20-Nov-77 2.13 3.95 Luxembourg 1-Feb-59 -11.38 1.99
Greece 18-Oct-81 16.19 3.64 Luxembourg 7-Jun-64 -26.59 3.43
Greece 2-Jun-85 -11.67 1.98 Luxembourg 15-Dec-68 -22.82 2.61
Greece 18-Jun-89 5.25 4.18 Luxembourg 26-May-74 -28.62 1.81
Greece 5-Nov-89 14.48 3.79 Luxembourg 10-Jun-79 -15.04 1.92
Greece 8-Apr-90 2.42 3.33 Luxembourg 17-Jun-84 -16.22 1.58
Greece 10-Oct-93 -7.94 1.15 Luxembourg 18-Jun-89 -2.38 2.08
Greece 22-Sep-96 -12.42 0.48 Luxembourg 12-Jun-94 -16.52 1.67
Greece 9-Apr-00 -12.19 1.56 Luxembourg 13-Jun-99 -9.16 1.94
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Malta 26-Oct-96 15.55 1.64 Spain 15-Jun-77 -4.99 3.37
Malta 5-Sep-98 -12.85 1.87 Spain 1-Mar-79 -5.16 3.05
Netherlands 17-May-46 1.57 5.55 Spain 28-Oct-82 -9.80 1.91
Netherlands 7-Jul-48 5.57 6.86 Spain 22-Jun-86 -7.05 3.18
Netherlands 25-Jun-52 17.73 3.37 Spain 29-Oct-89 -21.47 2.48
Netherlands 13-Jun-56 8.54 2.94 Spain 6-Jun-93 -22.91 4.21
Netherlands 12-Mar-59 -8.49 6.82 Spain 3-Mar-96 -2.36 1.24
Netherlands 15-May-63 -14.97 5.99 Spain 12-Mar-00 -0.70 1.23
Netherlands 15-Feb-67 2.08 3.62 Sweden 17-Sep-44 -10.38 7.46
Netherlands 28-Mar-71 -25.43 4.06 Sweden 19-Sep-48 -22.02 9.08
Netherlands 29-Nov-72 -17.42 4.46 Sweden 21-Sep-52 -15.89 9.47
Netherlands 25-May-77 -10.81 2.02 Sweden 26-Sep-56 -32.61 4.60
Netherlands 26-May-81 -19.05 1.08 Sweden 1-Jun-58 -11.02 4.05
Netherlands 8-Sep-82 -11.29 1.33 Sweden 18-Sep-60 -49.49 5.86
Netherlands 21-May-86 -3.27 1.14 Sweden 20-Sep-64 -47.44 2.70
Netherlands 6-Sep-89 -10.83 1.42 Sweden 15-Sep-68 -44.14 6.51
Netherlands 3-May-94 1.19 0.98 Sweden 20-Sep-70 -41.39 6.78
Netherlands 6-May-98 -12.39 1.45 Sweden 16-Sep-73 -9.41 9.57
Netherlands 15-May-02 2.49 2.01 Sweden 19-Sep-76 -12.49 6.58
Netherlands 22-Jan-03 1.47 2.47 Sweden 16-Sep-79 -17.62 3.80
Nth. Ireland 1-Jan-21 13.35 6.50 Sweden 19-Sep-82 -20.07 6.42
Nth. Ireland 1-Jan-25 -15.14 8.30 Sweden 15-Sep-85 -13.28 8.25
Nth. Ireland 1-Jan-29 6.52 5.21 Sweden 18-Sep-88 -20.92 6.84
Nth. Ireland 1-Jan-33 -21.65 8.99 Sweden 15-Sep-91 -2.57 7.52
Nth. Ireland 1-Feb-38 -0.17 5.94 Sweden 18-Sep-94 26.60 3.76
Nth. Ireland 1-Jun-45 -25.24 5.96 Sweden 21-Sep-98 -1.62 4.96
Nth. Ireland 1-Feb-49 -6.46 5.71 Sweden 15-Sep-02 -10.37 4.95
Nth. Ireland 1-Oct-53 -8.79 9.71 Other
Nth. Ireland 1-Mar-58 -8.73 7.73 Albania 31-Mar-91 15.67 5.02
Nth. Ireland 1-Mar-63 -17.46 4.53 Albania 22-Mar-92 15.88 3.38
Nth. Ireland 1-Nov-65 -13.00 5.56 Albania 26-May-96 7.53 2.24
Nth. Ireland 1-Feb-69 -13.19 8.46 Albania 29-Jun-97 4.70 5.44
Nth. Ireland 1-Jul-73 50.00 5.00 Armenia 5-Jul-95 6.90 5.76
Poland 27-Oct-91 14.13 11.85 Armenia 30-May-99 -1.29 7.87
Poland 19-Sep-93 -8.06 5.64 Armenia 25-May-03 13.32 7.07
Poland 21-Sep-97 13.20 5.75 Australia 28-Sep-46 2.17 2.98
Poland 23-Sep-01 -4.51 3.20 Australia 10-Dec-49 1.51 2.64
Portugal 25-Apr-75 -45.91 5.02 Australia 28-Apr-51 -3.32 3.28
Portugal 25-Apr-76 2.90 6.57 Australia 29-May-54 1.81 2.83
Portugal 5-Oct-79 7.94 5.78 Australia 10-Dec-55 5.39 10.08
Portugal 5-Oct-80 16.41 4.34 Australia 22-Nov-58 -7.02 5.07
Portugal 25-Apr-83 -7.97 4.61 Australia 9-Dec-61 16.07 12.14
Portugal 6-Oct-85 21.72 7.53 Australia 30-Nov-63 -15.52 4.74
Portugal 19-Jul-87 23.29 5.73 Australia 26-Nov-66 -14.15 3.63
Portugal 6-Oct-91 -9.35 2.13 Australia 25-Oct-69 -11.65 3.06
Portugal 1-Oct-95 -11.48 1.32 Australia 2-Dec-72 16.51 4.37
Portugal 10-Oct-99 -17.18 2.61 Australia 18-May-74 5.98 7.17
Romania 20-May-90 -21.77 10.17 Australia 13-Dec-75 18.16 3.67
Romania 27-Sep-92 8.23 3.64 Australia 10-Dec-77 5.30 2.97
Romania 3-Nov-96 -13.63 5.80 Australia 18-Oct-80 9.77 3.33
Romania 26-Nov-00 -7.47 1.90 Australia 5-Mar-83 14.91 3.04
Slovakia 9-Jun-90 -2.47 5.57 Australia 1-Dec-84 14.66 2.45
Slovakia 6-Jun-92 2.78 7.14 Australia 11-Jul-87 10.11 2.92
Slovakia 30-Sep-94 0.28 2.49 Australia 24-Mar-90 1.16 3.55
Slovakia 30-Sep-98 0.58 2.17 Australia 13-Mar-93 16.98 2.14
Slovakia 20-Sep-02 22.41 2.57 Australia 2-Mar-96 15.93 2.00
Slovenia 8-Apr-90 -1.28 2.94 Australia 3-Oct-98 39.47 3.79
Slovenia 6-Dec-92 2.60 7.98 Australia 10-Nov-01 17.48 4.35
Slovenia 10-Nov-96 -7.07 6.78 Azerbaijan 12-Nov-95 9.38 13.71
Slovenia 15-Oct-00 6.90 6.32 Azerbaijan 5-Nov-00 14.77 5.26
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Belarus 29-Nov-95 1.23 5.61 Japan 20-Nov-60 7.34 5.75
Bosnia-Herz. 18-Nov-90 40.90 5.98 Japan 21-Nov-63 13.13 6.57
Bosnia-Herz. 14-Sep-96 37.57 5.02 Japan 29-Jan-67 -25.87 5.65
Bosnia-Herz. 12-Sep-98 -0.90 6.21 Japan 27-Dec-69 -8.89 5.53
Bosnia-Herz. 11-Nov-00 15.39 7.23 Japan 10-Dec-72 -26.06 8.11
Canada 11-Jun-45 -2.73 7.17 Japan 5-Dec-76 -12.28 8.21
Canada 27-Jun-49 9.83 2.75 Japan 7-Oct-79 -23.04 5.31
Canada 10-Aug-53 -6.12 5.33 Japan 22-Jun-80 -23.28 5.77
Canada 10-Jun-57 7.51 5.08 Japan 18-Dec-83 -1.05 6.86
Canada 31-Mar-58 -1.45 4.86 Japan 6-Jul-86 6.56 5.70
Canada 18-Jun-62 -5.70 10.55 Japan 18-Feb-90 -17.18 5.83
Canada 8-Apr-63 -0.34 5.86 Japan 18-Jul-93 -11.04 7.44
Canada 8-Nov-65 -12.76 5.03 Japan 20-Oct-96 -6.89 7.65
Canada 25-Jun-68 -9.39 2.98 Japan 25-Jun-00 -2.49 7.13
Canada 30-Oct-72 -11.95 5.51 Macedonia 11-Nov-90 5.15 4.68
Canada 8-Jul-74 2.42 5.92 Macedonia 16-Oct-94 -13.48 4.36
Canada 22-May-79 0.61 4.34 Macedonia 18-Oct-98 9.55 3.48
Canada 18-Feb-80 0.56 2.69 Mexico 1-Jul-46 6.91 2.83
Canada 4-Sep-84 0.82 6.34 Mexico 3-Jul-49 50.00 5.00
Canada 21-Nov-88 -4.80 7.33 Mexico 6-Jul-52 50.00 5.00
Canada 25-Oct-93 5.17 3.18 Mexico 1-Jul-55 4.19 3.42
Canada 2-Jun-97 7.94 4.06 Mexico 6-Jul-58 50.00 5.00
Canada 27-Nov-00 -10.36 5.92 Mexico 1-Jul-61 4.77 2.67
Georgia 11-Oct-92 9.63 8.87 Mexico 5-Jul-64 1.35 1.96
Georgia 5-Nov-95 24.97 9.29 Mexico 1-Jul-67 50.00 5.00
Georgia 31-Oct-99 27.90 4.69 Mexico 5-Jul-70 11.04 5.70
Georgia 28-Mar-04 -5.41 4.78 Mexico 1-Jul-73 39.31 4.79
Iceland 30-Jun-46 -8.45 5.61 Mexico 1-Jul-76 10.00 2.26
Iceland 23-Oct-49 33.99 6.17 Mexico 1-Jul-79 -13.29 3.07
Iceland 28-Jun-53 33.88 5.67 Mexico 4-Jul-82 -1.37 3.12
Iceland 24-Jun-56 9.55 8.86 Mexico 7-Jul-85 -10.44 3.36
Iceland 28-Jun-59 25.19 8.35 Mexico 6-Jul-88 -2.04 3.27
Iceland 25-Oct-59 29.47 7.85 Mexico 18-Aug-91 18.25 3.92
Iceland 9-Jun-63 16.17 5.98 Mexico 21-Aug-94 -9.17 1.99
Iceland 11-Jun-67 7.97 10.18 Mexico 6-Jul-97 -6.88 1.38
Iceland 13-Jun-71 -13.69 10.33 Mexico 2-Jul-00 -1.43 3.04
Iceland 30-Jun-74 41.15 7.68 Moldova 27-Feb-94 3.57 3.53
Iceland 25-Jun-78 -1.67 7.38 Montenegro 9-Dec-90 1.30 4.98
Iceland 2-Dec-79 0.09 7.64 Montenegro 20-Dec-92 7.95 4.52
Iceland 23-Apr-83 27.60 6.13 Montenegro 3-Nov-96 12.71 3.88
Iceland 25-Apr-87 -7.09 4.79 Montenegro 31-May-98 8.67 4.25
Iceland 20-Apr-91 30.12 5.38 New Zealand 27-Nov-46 17.24 3.30
Iceland 8-Apr-95 -17.51 4.59 New Zealand 30-Nov-49 -10.72 2.57
Iceland 8-May-99 -5.32 4.62 New Zealand 1-Sep-51 6.67 4.53
Israel 25-Jan-49 0.87 10.18 New Zealand 13-Nov-54 -18.42 11.36
Israel 30-Jul-51 -2.84 6.83 New Zealand 30-Nov-57 -23.06 11.93
Israel 26-Jul-55 12.74 6.67 New Zealand 26-Nov-60 -10.47 3.29
Israel 3-Jul-59 13.05 11.25 New Zealand 30-Nov-63 -14.28 5.72
Israel 15-Aug-61 8.41 6.85 New Zealand 26-Nov-66 -11.87 1.96
Israel 2-Nov-65 -9.87 9.31 New Zealand 29-Nov-69 -18.77 5.25
Israel 28-Oct-69 3.25 13.12 New Zealand 25-Nov-72 -15.34 2.24
Israel 31-Dec-73 5.13 7.53 New Zealand 29-Nov-75 -5.09 2.01
Israel 17-May-77 5.21 7.25 New Zealand 25-Nov-78 -10.07 3.21
Israel 30-Jun-81 19.75 4.40 New Zealand 28-Nov-81 -1.99 2.79
Israel 23-Jul-84 23.08 12.38 New Zealand 14-Jul-84 5.22 3.28
Israel 1-Nov-88 8.02 22.43 New Zealand 15-Aug-87 -16.07 2.82
Israel 23-Jun-92 11.88 17.25 New Zealand 27-Oct-90 0.85 2.26
Israel 29-May-96 22.13 14.37 New Zealand 6-Nov-93 -10.76 2.75
Israel 17-May-99 6.64 12.83 New Zealand 12-Oct-96 -23.02 6.00
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New Zealand 27-Nov-99 1.30 2.52
New Zealand 27-Jul-02 -10.66 6.31
Norway 8-Oct-45 -14.11 4.53
Norway 10-Oct-49 -22.18 5.77
Norway 12-Oct-53 -26.74 5.32
Norway 7-Oct-57 -17.95 6.30
Norway 11-Sep-61 -23.03 3.89
Norway 12-Sep-65 -36.85 1.92
Norway 7-Sep-69 -33.26 3.03
Norway 9-Sep-73 -24.08 1.67
Norway 11-Sep-77 -20.64 2.26
Norway 14-Sep-81 -15.60 1.58
Norway 8-Sep-85 -17.81 1.79
Norway 11-Sep-89 -21.68 1.40
Norway 13-Sep-93 -16.39 1.21
Norway 16-Sep-97 -9.63 1.46
Norway 10-Sep-01 -20.59 0.98
Russia 12-Dec-93 16.24 6.12
Russia 17-Dec-95 15.25 4.18
Russia 19-Dec-99 44.64 4.79
Russia 7-Dec-03 -2.15 4.67
Serbia 9-Dec-90 8.94 6.89
Serbia 20-Dec-92 21.66 4.40
Serbia 19-Dec-93 43.93 5.76
Serbia 21-Sep-97 27.82 3.64
Serbia 23-Dec-00 4.19 3.77
Sri Lanka 1-Jan-47 50.00 5.00
Sri Lanka 1-Jan-52 -7.87 4.54
Sri Lanka 1-Apr-56 -14.91 5.94
Sri Lanka 1-Jul-60 -18.04 4.40
Sri Lanka 1-Mar-65 -2.32 4.30
Sri Lanka 1-May-70 -18.58 2.49
Sri Lanka 1-Jul-77 -16.03 1.95
Switzerland 26-Oct-47 13.24 3.70
Switzerland 28-Oct-51 11.50 6.57
Switzerland 30-Oct-55 18.01 6.49
Switzerland 25-Oct-59 13.13 4.23
Switzerland 27-Oct-63 8.24 6.80
Switzerland 29-Oct-67 6.01 5.15
Switzerland 31-Oct-71 -0.09 2.63
Switzerland 26-Oct-75 5.31 3.36
Switzerland 21-Oct-79 -0.57 3.60
Switzerland 23-Oct-83 1.53 4.37
Switzerland 18-Oct-87 -0.49 2.82
Switzerland 20-Oct-91 -10.96 3.92
Switzerland 22-Oct-95 10.79 13.93
Switzerland 24-Oct-99 22.64 2.90
Switzerland 19-Oct-03 16.79 4.65
Turkey 14-May-50 29.91 4.09
Turkey 2-May-54 38.45 4.18
Turkey 27-Oct-57 37.56 3.68
Turkey 15-Oct-61 -3.50 1.85
Turkey 10-Oct-65 -12.37 2.21
Turkey 12-Oct-69 0.72 1.41
Turkey 14-Oct-73 -5.98 2.29
Turkey 5-Jun-77 19.20 2.55
Turkey 6-Nov-83 -2.53 4.42
Turkey 29-Nov-87 5.85 2.28
Turkey 20-Oct-91 9.62 2.18
Turkey 24-Dec-95 16.59 3.55
Turkey 18-Apr-99 13.16 3.00
Ukraine 10-Apr-94 -0.29 7.07
Ukraine 29-Mar-98 2.95 6.04
Ukraine 30-Mar-02 -5.28 9.43
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Chapter 3
Endogenous Preferences: The
Political Consequences of
Economic Institutions
3.1 Introduction
Why is it that over time certain societies have voted significantly more left, and
others significantly more right on the standard political spectrum? Indeed, a
simple look at countries’ voting records reveals striking left-right patterns. This
is the question that animates this paper. In fact, Downs’ seminal An Economic
Theory of Democracy [Downs, 1957, p. 140] left us this question as a research
agenda:
What forces shape this important parameter [the aggregate distribu-
tion of preferences]? At the beginning of our study, we assumed that
voters’ tastes are fixed, which means that the voter distribution is
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given. Thus we dodged the question just posed and have been evad-
ing it ever since.
Downs’ observation could not have been more prophetic. Despite pioneering
attempts [Lipset and Rokkan, 1967], it would appear that there still is no account
in political science or economics that provides a satisfactory explanation for the
cross-national variation in political preferences. Slow progress on this question,
however, is probably less a sign of stagnant scholarship than it is an indication of
the richness of this question. Many studies have consistently taken voter prefer-
ences as the dependent variable. The literatures on economic voting [Lewis-Beck
and Paldam, 2000], the electoral gender gap [Inglehart and Norris, 2000], and
genopolitics [Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005; Fowler, Baker and Dawes, 2008;
Settle et al., 2010] continue to uncover important insights. Yet by the sheer na-
ture of their key explanatory variable they cannot provide explanatory power for
cross-national variation. This is to say that there are no countries that have a
markedly female or male biased population1; nor are there countries where the
fluctuations in economic performance could be considered structurally different
from any other country. Similarly, it is not yet known whether particular genes
such as the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4-7R), that is associated with a lib-
1To illustrate, Powdthavee and Oswald [2010] look at the impact of having one or more
daughters on individuals’ voting behaviour. Their finding is that having daughters moves
people to vote leftist. Sadly enough for left parties there are an approximately equal number of
girls and boys being born. Unless there are many more girls being born in Scandinavia, such
studies do not help explain cross-national differences in voting behaviour.
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eral political ideology, is more widespread in some countries than others in light
of genetic ancestry. As it turns out, the economic voting and electoral gender gap
literatures may not sufficiently consider the potential impact that the accumu-
lated institutions of the political economy may have on their individual subjects’
voting behaviour. Given the results discussed later this could be an important
source of omitted variable bias.1 Needless to say that there is also a lot of work
that discusses electoral behaviour within individual countries [Campbell et al.,
1960; Caplan, 2008; Gelman et al., 2008]. But these country specific accounts do
not have the ambition to provide explanatory power for a larger set of countries.
A large number of studies use left-right partisanship as an explanatory variable
when looking at a variety of phenomena including macroeconomic performance
[Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, 1991; Kenworthy, 2006], redistribution [Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004; Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009; Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2003, 2004] and wage setting [Johansen, Mydland and Strom,
2007]. When the more recent studies observed the prevalence of either left or right
politics they pointed to the importance of electoral systems and coalition dynam-
ics [Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009; Iversen and Stephens, 2008] or the strength
and centralization of labour unions [Alesina and Glaeser, 2004]. But then these
1One of few notable exceptions is Edlund and Pande [2002]. They show that women in the
US vote more for the Democratic Party than men do. Their argument rests on the interaction
between a decline in marriage and the provision of social security and they include a battery
of economic control variables for robustness. While their analysis is restricted to the US, it
may provide insights into cross-national differences in voting behaviour if marriage declines and
social security are substantially different across countries.
38
authors used such observations as a means to explaining levels of redistribution
and social spending.
This brief review of the literature indicates that there is little research that
directly engages the cross-national trajectories in voting behaviour. A general
model for voting behaviour ought to be a central topic in comparative political
economy. As Campbell et al. [1960, p. 397] observed, when the data are available
then “political behaviour is the ultimate dependent variable in our theoretical
scheme.”
This paper starts by introducing a new data set for the ideological position of
the electoral center—the median voter—that corrects for stochastic error in the
widely used statistics from the Comparative Manifesto Project. These aggregated
voter preferences serve as the dependent variable. Next, attention turns to how
political economies vary across countries and whether this explains the variety
in voting records. Those economic institutions are considered whose salience
is important in differentiating among political economies. Labour organization,
skill specificity, and public sector employment are such key economic institutions
that allow for distinguishing between the more coordinated and liberal market
economies. It will be argued that these particular institutions also influence the
political preferences of the individuals that they touch. Of course, over time
economic institutions are generated by a society of people with an ex ante set
of preferences, hence the empirical analysis employs an instrumental variable
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strategy to deal with reverse causality. Significant results show that at least since
1960 voter preferences have been endogenous to the economic institutions of their
political economy. The discussion of the empirical results also sheds light on some
recent findings in Political Economy and illustrates the principal argument with
a short case study of the UK under Margaret Thatcher. The logical implications
that follow from the analysis are stated when the paper concludes.
3.2 Voter preferences
Ever since the seminal work by Black [1948] and Downs [1957] introduced the con-
cept of the median voter, or the ideological position of the electoral center, the
concept has figured widely across literatures. While conceptually prominent, few
median voter arguments have been supported with robust data. This paper intro-
duces a new, updated, and improved data set for revealed voter preferences. The
data set employs the statistics provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project
[Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006] but corrects for stochastic error
building on the work by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009].
The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) codified all sentences of every
election manifesto to place parties on a left-right scale. The data are collected
such that each statement is assigned to either a pro-left or a pro-right category.
The scaling consists in subtracting the sum of percentage references to categories
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grouped as left from the sum of percentage references to categories grouped as
right. Consequently, negative scores represent a generally left position, whereas
positive scores are reflective of a right position. While use of the CMP data set
is widespread, it is not without its critics. Most criticism centers on errors in
CMP measurement because of the stochastic features of text generation and text
coding processes. Recent contributions on the limits of the CMP include Benoit
and Laver [2006], Edwards [2006], Hans and Ho¨nnige [2008], Mikhaylov, Benoit
and Laver [2008], and Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009]. Treating words as
data with error, Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] proceed by bootstrapping
the analysis of every coded manifesto. By way of these simulations they recon-
struct the stochastic processes that generated these political texts. In doing so
they are able to estimate degrees of non-systematic error for the thousands of
manifestos coded by the CMP. The use of these standard errors allows for bet-
ter empirical and theoretical inferences from the CMP data. The bootstrapping
work by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] also allows for generating new data
estimates of party policy positions. The alternative estimate for a party policy
position then becomes the mean estimator of the bootstrap simulations that were
drawn for each manifesto. These new data for party policy positions calibrate for
stochastic error in the CMP.1
1The Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] data set with CMP statistics, uncertainty mea-
sures, and bootstrapping mean estimators (“rilemean”) for party positions are available at
http://www.kenbenoit.net/
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This paper makes use of these new and corrected party policy positions. By
linking these data to electoral results using the Kim-Fording methodology [Kim
and Fording, 1998, 2003] we arrive at statistical measures for revealed voter pref-
erences. The position of the median voter is computed from vote shares for the
ideologically ranked parties. This is done by first ranking the parties by ideo-
logical score for every election in each country. Then for each party the interval
where its supporters are located is tabulated by locating the midpoints between
the ideologically neighboring parties. Assuming that voters choose the candidate
or party that is ideologically closest to them, a party will attract the votes of
those that are part of the interval that surrounds that party. The assumption
that voting behaviour is an expression of preferences or beliefs is common [Coate
and Conlin, 2004; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009]. Still, it is important to
underscore that this assumption implies a disregard of the part of the electorate
that may vote strategically rather than ideologically.1 Finally, the electoral re-
sults for each party at every election are matched to produce the percentage of
the electorate that is grouped into each ideological interval. As Kim and Ford-
ing [2003, p. 96] point out, their method requires us “to conceive of elections as
large-scale opinion polls.” Where the ballot acts as a survey in which the subject
chooses the party that is ideologically closest on the partisan left-right spectrum.
1Stevenson [2001] notes that estimates of the importance of strategic voting rarely attain
10%.
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As such, it is possible to treat election results as a grouped frequency distribution
and tabulate a median statistic. The results range between -100 (extreme left)
and +100 (extreme right) and non-election values are interpolated linearly. An
accompanying research paper provides more detail on the precise tabulations to
build these new median voter statistics, compares these data with survey-based
measures, and extends the data set to over 50 democracies. The research paper
and the data set are available online and from the author. Figure 3.1 shows the
resulting left-right positions of 18 Western democracies averaged over 1960-2003.
It is important to highlight the fact that the median voter statistics are derived
indirectly via party policy positions and their success at the election polls, and
not from direct evidence of voter opinions. However, as noted by Pontusson
and Rueda [2007, p. 13], “it seems quite accurate to think of the position of the
median voter as being constructed by parties in competition with each other.”
Furthermore, given the inherent difficulties in employing survey data for cross-
national and historic analyses of voter preferences, these median voter data may
be a reasonable alternative. First, historic survey data may not be available
for a number of countries. Second, left-right self-placement may not allow for
cross-national analysis as subjective notions of the political center vary quite
dramatically across countries. Finally, as explained in McDonald and Budge
[2005] “an additional problem with relying on survey data to measure citizens’
ideologies is that strong evidence exists that citizens’ Left-Right self-placements
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Figure 3.1: The Median Voter (1960-2003)
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are subject to assimilation effects, that is, that citizens tend to place themselves
unduly close to parties they like for non-policy-related reasons.” Empirical issues
such as the above may make the use of public opinion polling often inadequate
and, hence, the usefulness of the median voter data as developed here.
As a check, this paper also runs its empirical and graphical analyses using a
second measure of voter preferences; the Electoral Center of Gravity as devised
by Cusack [1997].1 The CMP-based measures have more clout because of their
detail and comprehensiveness but the Cusack indicator also provides time series
from 1960. The underlying data sets have been widely used and evaluated in
the literature [Bakker, Edwards and de Vries, 2005; Edwards, 2006; Gabel and
Huber, 2000; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006; Pontusson and Rueda, 2007; Powell,
2000].
3.3 Economic institutions and voter preferences
Could the economic institutions of a political economy be a key to understanding
the position of their median voter or the electoral center of gravity? As Frey [1990,
p. 446] noted: “[T]he comparative analysis of institutions is able to solve long-
standing theoretical problems which so far have not been treated in a satisfactory
1The electoral center of political gravity measures are developed by Cusack [1997] who, in
turn, used the Gross and Sigelman [1984] index on electoral results, legislative seat distribution,
and cabinet seat distribution, as well as data on the ideological position of parties based on
expert survey data by Castles and Mair [1984].
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way.” By now, economists and political scientists have realized the importance
of institutions in shaping economic performance [Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
son, 2001; North, 1990; Platteau, 2000], the level of redistribution [Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; McCarty and Pontusson, 2009; Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2004], and cultural behaviour [Bowles, 1998]. An institutional
analysis of voting behaviour could produce equally important insights.1
This paper uses the cooperative institution index [Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998;
Kenworthy, 2006] and the coordination index [Hall and Gingerich, 2009] as met-
rics for the accumulated economic institutions in a political economy. These
measures also allow for a more sophisticated way of distinguishing between co-
ordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) as
described by Hall and Soskice [2001] in Varieties of Capitalism. They proposed a
distinction between two clusters of capitalist economies on the basis of the means
that firms and other actors use to coordinate their actions across the political
economy. CMEs have firms primarily employ more strategic means of interact-
1Economic and democratic institutions have their origins. Understanding the development
of the institutions in the political economy is important scholarship and key references would
include Acemoglu and Robinson [2006]; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001], Alesina and
Glaeser [2004], Cusack, Torben and Soskice [2007], Robinson and Torvik [2008]. This paper
does not dwell on the development of institutions, but presumes institutional inertia. Most of
the aforementioned accounts trace back the origins of institutions to the end of the 19th and
start of the 20th century. The fact that the indicator for economic structure and organization
circa 1900 [Cusack, Torben and Soskice, 2007] strongly correlates with the more current index
for coordination [Hall and Gingerich, 2009] and the cooperative institution index [Hicks and
Kenworthy, 1998; Kenworthy, 2006] would lend credence to the notion of institutional path
dependency [North, 1990; Pierson, 2004] and, hence, institutional inertia. See Table 3.1 for a
correlations table of the key variables used in this paper.
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ing with labor organizations, financial institutions, and other actors across the
domestic political economy. LMEs rely more heavily on competitive markets to
coordinate relations between firms and other actors. Hall and Soskice [2001, p. 20]
describe and list CMEs (e.g. Sweden, Austria, Germany) and LMEs (e.g. USA,
UK, Australia).
Making parallel use of the coordination and cooperation indices allows for two
proxies for CMEs and LMEs as well as a robustness check. Hall and Gingerich
constructed the coordination index specifically to assess the degree to which coun-
tries rely on market or strategic coordination across the different spheres of their
political economy. The index incorporates data from the 1990-1995 period on cor-
porate governance (shareholder power, dispersion of control, size of stock market)
and labor relations (level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, la-
bor turnover). These measures for corporate governance and labor relations are
then loaded in the coordination index. The Hicks-Kenworthy cooperative insti-
tution index made a scoring of the degree of cooperation in nine spheres: (a)
relations among firms across industries; (b) relations among unions; (c) relations
between the state and interest groups; (d) relations among firms and investors;
(e) relations among firms and suppliers; (f) relations among competing firms; (g)
relations between labour and management; (h) relations among workers; and (i)
relations among functional departments within firms. Unlike the coordination
index, Hicks and Kenworthy looked at a longer time frame when developing their
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cooperative institution index (1960-1994). Their effort will allow for a longitudi-
nal analysis later on.
Figure 3.2 presents scatter plots with linear fits for the coordination and co-
operation indices on the two aforementioned voting measures: the median voter
and the electoral center of gravity. The result shows four variations on a theme.
The theme being the close association between left-right voting behaviour and
the level of coordination across the economic institutions of the political economy.
Next the paper considers three economic institutions that can be linked more
directly to individual voting behaviour and that are part and parcel in distin-
guishing CMEs from LMEs. The salience of labour organization, skill specificity,
and public sector employment typify political economies and are all correlated
(positively) with the overall level of coordination as reported in Table 3.1. The
arguments that follow aim to show how these specific economic institutions in-
fluence individual interests and lock in electoral preferences. Aggregating these
politically aligned micromotives results in the macrobehaviour that explains the
left-right voting patterns that developed over time across the 18 OECD nations
considered.
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Figure 3.2: Economic Institutions and Voter Preferences
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Table 3.1: Correlations Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Median Voter 1960-2003 1.00
(2) Electoral Center of  Gravity 1960-97 0.62 1.00
(3) Coordinated/Liberal Market Economy -0.55 -0.63 1.00
(4) Coordination 1990s (Hall-Gingerich) -0.46 -0.67 0.86 1.00
(5) Cooperation 1960-1989 (Hicks-Kenworthy) -0.64 -0.70 0.93 0.91 1.00
(6) Coordination circa 1900 -0.46 -0.61 0.93 0.78 0.80 1.00
(7) Skill specificity -0.60 -0.48 0.82 0.74 0.78 0.78 1.00
(8) Wage setting score 1960-94 -0.46 -0.77 0.87 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.71 1.00
(9) Government employment -0.46 -0.48 0.08 -0.01 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.08
3.3.1 Skill specificity
In an important contribution to our understanding of the political economy,
Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice [2001] show that CMEs depend more on industry-
and firm-specific skills than LMEs. The workforce of the latter type of political
economies, however, is characterized by more generalist skills. Empirically, the
levels of skill specificity can be shown by looking at the importance of vocational
training and the degree of labor turnover at firms. More vocational training
systems and longer levels of firm tenure are indicative of greater skill specificity.
When a worker invests in more specific skills he or she must have some reassurance
that the lessened transferability of those labour skills will not lead to an expected
revenue stream with increased risk and volatility. To insure against the possibil-
ity of longer periods of unemployment and, in effect, smooth out the expected
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revenue stream it would be in the worker’s interest to have reasonable unemploy-
ment benefit packages in place if needed. Such policy preferences are precisely
what Iversen and Soskice [2001] and Iversen [2005] find when producing estimates
that show, controlling for income, that the demand for social spending is strongly
associated with skill specificity for all OECD countries.1 The same argument is
further developed in Kitschelt and Rehm [2005], Cusack and Rehm [2006], Mc-
Carty and Pontusson [2009], Anderson and Pontusson [2007], and Iversen and
Stephens [2008]. Because the higher levels of skill specificity in CMEs are associ-
ated with the demand for robust unemployment policies across the social strata,
this paper suggests that such preferences should translate into over-proportional
support for leftist politics. Figure 3.3 shows the scatter plots for skill specificity
on the median voter and the electoral center of gravity. The linear fits indicate a
negative correlation between skill specificity and right partisan preferences.
1An important clarification is warranted. This paper does not intend to confuse coordination
across the economic institutions with the welfare state and redistributive policies. The work by
Persson and Tabellini [2004], Allan and Scruggs [2004], and Alesina and Glaeser [2004] indicates
that electoral institutions are at the origins of the welfare state. The empirical analysis in this
paper includes electoral institutions (electoral district magnitudes) and economic institutions
(by way of the coordination and cooperation indices), hence it is not warranted to include
a control variable for the welfare state. Also because the salient institutions of the political
economy predate the welfare state, this paper considers the variety in accumulated institutions
as being inclusive of the variety in welfare policies. The fact that there would be collinearity
between these variables is an indication that they would be measuring overlapping effects.
51
Figure 3.3: Skill Specificity and Voter Preferences
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3.3.2 Labour organization
The empirical literatures in economics and political science come together on the
fact that strong labour organization and coordinated wage bargaining leads to
wage compression and less inequality [Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu, Aghion and
Violante, 2001; Aghion and Durlauf, 2005; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Krug-
man, 1994; Scheve and Stasavage, 2009]. Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante [2001]
suggest that sweeping skill-biased technological change has substantially reduced
the incentives for skilled workers to remain in a coalition of union workers. The
result of this dynamic is general deunionization and a serious increase in inequal-
ity. This logic is intuitively appealing and widely applicable but they seem to
disregard, however, the fact that labour organization in some CMEs has not de-
clined. Kwon and Pontusson [2008] find that a number of countries have kept a
relatively stable level of unionization (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden). This would imply then that there are a vast number of skilled workers
that opt to remain in a situation of coordinated wage bargaining. This raises the
obvious question: which skilled workers would be willing to remain in a heteroge-
nous coalition of unionized workers and accept a paycut? Iversen and Stephens
[2008] point towards the protection of skill investments and the possibility to be
rehired elsewhere at the same wage. But they, nor any other authors, have ade-
quately dealt with the proposition by Acemoglu et al that the increased returns
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to skills have substantially lowered the incentives for skilled workers to be part
of a larger union. It would appear that neither discipline is able to formulate a
truly satisfying answer to the question just posed.
Combining the key insights from the aforementioned arguments, this paper
offers a slightly different account. Given its cross-national salience, it is impor-
tant to consider the level of skill specificity of the individual as he or she enters
a (hypothetical) wage bargaining situation with a potential employer. Having
gone through multiple years of specialized or vocational training this individ-
ual has a reduced set of employment possibilities and greater risk exposure to
market volatility. The result of being less flexible on the job market is that the
individual with a high degree of skill specificity is more likely to be in a disad-
vantaged bargaining position as compared to the generalist. In order to offset
this bargaining disadvantage—and the insecurity that comes with it—there is a
clear interest in being part of a larger countervailing power notwithstanding the
wage compression that this entails [Galbraith, 1956]. In effect, Bender and Sloane
[1999] showed that unionized workers feel more secure in their jobs and Anderson
and Pontusson [2007] find that the social protection measures that unions fight
for effectively reduce employment insecurity. It is also important to note that
Acemoglu and Pischke [1999] found that unionization and wage coordination are
associated with higher levels of training. This reinforces the situational lock-in
of skill-specific workers and their associated set of interests. In contrast, the
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more flexible generally skilled person is less likely to face a disadvantaged wage
bargaining position when negotiating at the individual or firm level. Moreover,
because standardized wages would disable the pursuit of more lucrative oppor-
tunities elsewhere this person has no interest whatsoever in coordinated wage
bargaining.1
The partisan agenda that best serves the demands for unionization and wage
coordination would presumably be the politics of the left. Johansen, Mydland
and Strom [2007] show that government colour matters in the coordination of
wage bargaining. For the case of Norway, they show empirically that coordinated
wage bargaining will only produce its effects if left partisanship is part of the
equation. Returning to the larger theme of this paper, given all the above argu-
ments it is conjectured that for political economies that maintain encompassing
labour organization there will be an over-proportional number of individuals with
interests aligned to left partisanship. Figure 3.4 shows scatter plots for the wage
setting score [Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998] on the median voter and the electoral
center of gravity. Linear fits show clear negative correlations. A high (low) degree
of coordinated wage bargaining is associated with left (right) voting behaviour.
1It remains to say that, in general, low-skilled and unskilled workers across the different
political economies continue to have a strong stake in coordinated wage bargaining as it would
raise the wage level for those that are employed.
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Figure 3.4: Labour Organization and Voter Preferences
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3.3.3 Public sector employment
Individuals employed in the public sector have an economic self-interest in larger
public budgets and are known to be more supportive of expansionary government
than private sector employees [Blais, Blake and Dion, 1993a,b, 1997; Cusack and
Rehm, 2006; Knutsen, 2005; Kwon and Pontusson, 2008]. Knutsen [2005, p. 594]
explains that “[t]he extent to which one’s own economic interests are directly
linked to political decisions is perhaps the most noticeable difference between
working in the public or private sector.” Indeed, to a public servant a relatively
large public sector means more career opportunities and economic rewards. Pri-
vate sector employees and independents may also have an important stake in
expansionary social policies when it benefits their economic situation, as dis-
cussed previously. However, the immediate economic fates of all private sector
workers are largely contingent on the market and the ability of their organization
to profit from it. The brunt of the costs associated with an expansionary gov-
ernment and market intervention is stomached by all individuals in the private
sector. The more liberal market economies are well-known to be associated with
lower tax rates, smaller government, and less interventionist policies. CMEs, on
the other had, support a larger public sector. Intuitively, there would seem to
be an obvious link between the political preferences of public servants and left
partisanship. Kwon and Pontusson [2008] note that over the 1970s and 1980s the
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left parties in many OECD countries saw the unionized public servants emerge as
a core constituency. Moreover, Blais, Blake and Dion [1993a] tested the hypoth-
esis that leftist government, as compared to a right-wing government, is more
generous when granting wage increases to public sector employees. Their empir-
ical study concludes that, ceteris paribus, wage increases are 10% higher under
leftist governments. Figure 3.5 plots government employment as a percentage
of the total labour force on the median voter and the electoral center of gravity.
The linear fits show a negative relationship between government employment and
right-wing voting. CMEs typically support a larger public sector, hence gathering
more left partisan support. Special attention is drawn to the Scandinavian coun-
tries of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway as they would appear in a world apart
when considering the public sector and left-wing voting. Indeed, their high levels
of government employment could perhaps solely explain their distinct left vot-
ing behaviour, without even having to consider other complementary economic
institutions.1
Having looked at skill specificity, labour organization, and public sector em-
ployment it would appear that there are good reasons to believe that these—and
perhaps other—economic institutions jointly influence individual voting behaviour.
1Iversen and Rosenbluth [2008] and Iversen and Stephens [2008] note that in the Scandi-
navian countries an over-proportional share of the public sector draws on women. The gender
equalizing policies instigated in the early 1970s (e.g. public day care centers) would partially
explain the current size of the public sector, as well as female labor force participation more
generally.
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Figure 3.5: Public Sector Employment and Voter Preferences
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As institutions lock in individual interests, these aligned micromotives turn into
the macrobehaviour that results in distinct cross-national voting records. It is
worthwhile observing that when these institutions are combined they may rep-
resent more than the mere sum of their parts. Hall and Soskice [2001] and Hall
and Gingerich [2009] make a strong case for institutional complementarities when
the presence of certain institutions in the political economy allows for general ef-
ficiencies when other particular institutions are also present. This fundamental
observation lies at the basis for taking the level of market or strategic coordina-
tion across institutions as the proxy that best allows for distinguishing between
political economies and their set of economic institutions.1
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Reverse causality
Not unlike the proverbial chicken and egg problem, is there a serious risk to
attribute partisan voter preferences to differences in the institutional set-up, if,
in fact, partisanship may have helped produce the institutional variation across
1Future research will look at how the ability of partisanship to boost economic performance
may be partially contingent on the variety of capitalism in which it operates. Preliminary
results suggest that the more productive marriage between a CME (LME) and left governance
(right governance) is expected to generate greater synergies from institutional complementarities
across the political economy. In turn, this would lead to better macro-economic performance
and, consequently, left (right) partisanship can expect an increased likelihood of political success
by way of sociotropic economic voting.
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political economies in the first place. This problem of reverse causality needs
to be adequately controlled for. An instrumental variable in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression allows for the estimation of causal relationships in
the presence of endogenous explanatory variables. The instrument cannot be
correlated with the dependent variable (exclusion) but should be highly correlated
with the endogenous explanatory variable for which it instruments (relevance). If
so, than a 2SLS regression allows for consistent estimation [Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2001; Heckman, 2008].
This paper proposes as instrument the measure of coordination circa the year
1900 as tabulated by Cusack, Torben and Soskice [2007] for an identical set of
eighteen OECD countries. This measure incorporates five indicators of early eco-
nomic structure and organization.1 Consequently, this paper posits that the level
of early coordination circa 1900 in spheres of the political economy such as guild
tradition and rural cooperatives have no direct effect on voting behaviour in the
period 1960-2003. However, this analysis supposes an indirect effect by way of
the more recent levels of economic coordination. A screening of the first-stage
results of the 2SLS models shows that early economic coordination is a relevant
and strong instrumental variable. The following are the first-stage results on the
1Equally weighted, the following five indicators are incorporated into the Cusack-Iversen-
Soskice measure of coordination circa 1900: (i) guild tradition and strong local economies
(source: Crouch, 1985); (ii) widespread rural cooperatives (sources: Crouch, 1985; Katzenstein,
1985); (iii) high employer coordination (sources: Thelen, 2004; Swenson, 2002; Mares, 2002);
(iv) industry unions (not craft); (v) large skill-based export sector (source: Katzenstein, 1985).
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endogenous regressors that are, respectively, a dummy for coordinated market
economy, the Hall-Gingerich coordination index, and the Hicks-Kenworthy coop-
erative institution index. Shea’s partial R-squared (1997) comes in at 0.74, 0.50,
and 0.75. The p-values on early economic coordination are all significant at 0.012,
0.034, and 0.002. The instrument also reveals superior F-statistics at 14.6, 6.8,
and 21.6 [Stock and Yogo, 2005].
The validity of the empirical results is contingent upon a satisfactory defense
of the instrumental variable strategy. The obvious critique is that economic
coordination circa 1900 does not satisfy the exclusion restriction and could be
the result of the underlying preferences at the time and that these preferences
may be correlated with today’s political preferences. First, a number of scholars
find that early economic coordination predates democracy and was not much
affected by popular preferences [Cusack, Torben and Soskice, 2007; Thelen, 2004].
Secondly, an empirical effort is made to test for an association between voter
preferences circa 1900 and voter preferences in 1960-2003. The data collection for
historical election results in Western Europe around the turn of the 19th century
by Caramani [2000] was extended to incorporate data from the US, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. The left-right score on a scale of -100 (extreme
left) to +100 (extreme right) was tabulated by subtracting the percentage vote
share of leftist parties from the percentage vote share of conservative parties. No
data was collected for Japan because it had a political ruling class at the time
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that proved too difficult to place on a left-right scale. All other democracies in
this study did have an established party system at the time that lend itself to
the left-right split. The results of the closest available data by country, year,
and left-right score are: Belgium (1900, +1.8); United Kingdom (1900, +4.1);
Norway (1906, +29.6); Netherlands (1918, -9.7); Italy (1900, +7.6); Germany
(1919, -12.2); Australia (1901, +51.0); France (1910, -4.1); Austria (1919, -20.0);
Finland (1907, -4.4); Denmark (1918, +19.0); United States (1900, +6.1); Canada
(1900, +4.2); New Zealand (1899, +24.0); Sweden (1911, +11.7); and Switzerland
(1899, +6.1). An OLS regression of voter preferences in the period 1960-2003 on
these historical data indicates that political preferences circa 1900 do not predict
current political preferences. In fact, the correlation and regression coefficients
are non-significant and virtually zero. This empirical test weakens a possible
critique of the IV strategy that would involve ideological path dependency.
3.4.2 Variables
The median voter and electoral center of gravity serve as the dependent variables.
The key explanatory variables that will be used successively are a dummy for
coordinated market economy, and its more sophisticated proxies that are the
coordination index and the cooperative institution index.
The regressions that follow include a battery of control variables that are not
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economic institutions but that could play a role in shaping voting behaviour. As
many studies have pointed to the importance of electoral institutions, a control
variable is included for Electoral District Magnitude. This more refined measure
improves on the often used but very crude dummy for majoritarianism versus
proportional representation. While majoritarian systems will always have but
one electoral district, to lump together the variety of district magnitudes in pro-
portional representation is tantamount to oversimplification. In line with the
literature on the subject, it is expected that more electoral district magnitudes
will be associated with more leftist voter preferences.1 Tertiary education repre-
sents the part of the population with tertiary attainment for age group 25-64.2
Religiosity is the part of the population that identifies themselves as being a re-
ligious person. From a number of recent studies that observed the importance of
religiosity in shaping policy preferences, it would be expected that higher levels
of religiosity are associated with more rightist voter preferences [Benabou and
Tirole, 2006; Huber and Stanig, N.d.; McCarty and Pontusson, 2009; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2006].3 The absolute size of the countries is accounted for by way of
the logarithm of Population.4 GDP per capita represents a measure to control for
the cross-national differences in wealth.5 The Gini coefficient controls for within
1Source: Carey and Hix [2011].
2Source: OECD Country Statistical Profiles.
3Source: the Association of Religion Data Archives.
4Source: OECD Statistics, Population and Vital Statistics.
5Source: Ameco, European Commission Economic and Financial Indicators.
64
country wealth disparities. The Meltzer-Richard model [Meltzer and Richard,
1981] would predict that societies with greater wealth disparities are likely to
shape more leftist voter preferences in order to claim more redistribution. More
recent studies, however, have found little empirical evidence to support the in-
tuitively appealing Meltzer-Richard model [Barnes, 2007; Iversen and Soskice,
2006].1 It has been argued that ethnic fractionalization acts as a catalyst against
policy preferences that favour redistribution [Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer,
2001]. Hence, it would be expected that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization
imply more rightist voter preferences.2 The proportion of the population that
lives in rural areas is also controlled for.3 A control variable is included for the
level of economic openness tabulated as the sum of exports and imports as a per-
centage of GDP.4 Finally, a two-year lagged dependent variable is introduced to
account for dynamics in the panel data analysis [Bartels, 2008a; Beck and Katz,
1996].
Table 3.2 presents the instrumented cross-sectional regressions. It is impor-
tant to emphasize the limitations of a cross-sectional analysis of a relatively small
number of observations (the sample consists of between 15 and 18 countries). The
consequence of a small sample size and low degrees of freedom is that the obtained
1Source: World Institute for Development Economics Research and the World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators.
2Source: Fearon [2003].
3Source: OECD Country Statistical Profiles.
4Source: the Comparative Welfare States Data Set.
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results are very sensitive to model specifications and should be treated with cau-
tion. Table 3.3 reports on the instrumented panel data models using time series
random effects. A panel data model is only possible for the cooperative insti-
tution index (Hicks-Kenworthy) as it provides a time series and some variation,
unlike the dummy variable for being a liberal/coordinated market economy or the
coordination index. The choice of random effects over fixed effects is reflective of
the research question that considers cross-national differences (not within coun-
try dynamics). Because the coordination index circa 1900 by Cusack, Torben
and Soskice [2007] is time invariant it cannot serve as an instrumental variable
in the panel data models. A 5-year lag of the cooperative institution index is
used instead. A 5-year lag is not ideal but common in time series analysis and
minimizes the loss of data points.
3.4.3 Results
The empirical results shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 corroborate the key propo-
sition of this paper: aggregated voter behaviour is endogenous to the accumulated
institutions of the political economy. The regressions on all measures of variety
in the economic institutions return significant and material coefficients. This is
the case for the cross-sectional 2SLS models as well as the generalized 2SLS time
series random effects models. The direction of the effects show that coordinated
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Table 3.2: Cross-sectional data: two-stage least squares models
Coordinated/Liberal Market Economy -8.506* -0.686***
(5.09) (0.22)
Coordination 1990s (Hall-Gingerich) -17.690* -1.136***
(10.88) (0.39)
Cooperation 1960-1989 (Hicks-Kenworthy) -16.460* -1.080***
(9.19) (0.23)
Controls:
Electoral district magnitude -0.051 -0.056 -0.066 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Tertiary education -0.892*** -0.564* -0.273 0.004 -0.009 0.009*
(0.25) (0.32) (0.23) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005)
Religiosity 22.78*** 18.69** 17.81** 0.080 0.074 0.028
(8.51) (8.98) (8.24) (0.34) (0.32) (0.20)
Log Population 4.508** 3.125 2.161 0.235*** 0.299*** 0.243***
(1.87) (2.11) (1.98) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
GDP p.c. 1.969** 1.510 1.540* 0.094** 0.063 0.069**
(0.89) (0.97) (0.89) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Gini 1.142** 0.528 0.452 -0.0036 0.0029 -0.0031
(0.47) (0.51) (0.48) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization 1.676 -5.70 -4.314 -0.343 -0.708 -0.656**
(8.85) (13.31) (11.55) (0.39) (0.51) (0.31)
Rural -0.016 -0.014 -0.036 0.0065* 0.0079** 0.0066***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Economic openess 0.074 0.066 0.058 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant -98.30*** -58.92 -54.8 -0.704 -0.61 -0.413
(31.84) (38.57) (35.59) (1.31) (1.41) (0.89)
Instrument:
Coordination circa 1900 (Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2007)
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 14.6 6.9 21.6 9.9 5.3 15.9
Observations 16 18 18 15 17 17
R-squared 0.76 0.54 0.62 0.73 0.62 0.85
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Hall & Soskice (2001) do not categorize France and Italy as either a CME or 
LME.  Cusack (2002) does not provide electoral data on New Zealand. These statistical tabulations make use of  the 
ivreg2 command in Stata. Control variables are averaged over 1960-2000.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Median Voter 1960-2003             Electoral Center of  Gravity 1960-97   
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Table 3.3: Panel data: instrumented random effects models
Median Voter
Electoral Center of  
Gravity
Cooperation (Hicks-Kenworthy) -4.586*** -0.038**
(1.24) (0.02)
Controls:
Electoral district magnitude -0.003 -0.0002
(0.01) (0.00)
Log Population 0.379 0.007*
(0.31) (0.004)
GDP p.c. 0.144*** 0.001**
(0.04) (0.00)
Gini -0.102** -0.0004
-0.047 (0.00)
Economic openess -0.003 0.0003*
(0.02) (0.00)
Lagged dependent variable 0.746*** 0.928***
(0.03) (0.02)
Constant -0.481 0.153**
(4.31) (0.07)
Instrument:
Cooperation 5-year lag
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 35.7 28.9
Observations 535 503
Number of  groups 18 17
R-squared within 0.48 0.28
R-squared between 0.97 0.99
R-squared overall 0.71 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The time series for the Hicks-
Kenworthy cooperative institution index does not extend beyond 1994.
Previously used controls that were time-invariant or for which no time series
could be obtained are not included. Because the coordination index circa
1900 by Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice (2007) is time invariant it could not be
used as an instrumental variable. A 5-year lag of the cooperative institution
index is used instead.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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market economies, indicated by greater levels of strategic coordination and coop-
erative institutions, move the median voter or electoral center of gravity towards
the left. Conversely, liberal market economies move the median voter or electoral
center of gravity to the right on a standardized partisan spectrum.
No other variable returns consistently significant coefficients across all mod-
els. Still, it is worthwhile to touch briefly on a number of significant results.
The coefficients on religiosity, when regressed on the median voter, turn out to
be significant and important. This empirical support for a strong positive cor-
relation between religiosity and rightist voter preferences aligns with the recent
work by Benabou and Tirole [2006], Scheve and Stasavage [2006], and Huber
and Stanig [N.d.]. These authors found that there are psychological, normative,
and economic reasons for why higher levels of religiosity weaken the demand for
redistributive policies. Needless to say that rightist governance is typically asso-
ciated with less redistributive policies than leftist governance. GDP per capita
comes in significantly except in the case of the Hall-Gingerich coordination index.
That higher levels of wealth is positively correlated with rightist voter preferences
would seem to conform to general intuition. This is also the case for the level
of population that shows a positive correlation with the electoral center of grav-
ity. Bigger countries imply less social proximity that, in turn, would weaken the
interest in social policies. As noted earlier, there is scant empirical evidence for
the theoretic model by Meltzer and Richard [1981] that would find that democra-
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cies with higher levels of wealth inequality claim more redistribution. This study
produces slightly mixed results for its measure of inequality: the Gini coefficient.
Overall that would seem to lend support to the more recent findings that, in fact,
societies with high levels of inequality do not necessarily mobilize its poorest to
claim redistributive policies [Barnes, 2007; Iversen and Soskice, 2009]. Ethnic
fractionalization, while suggested to be of importance by Luttmer [2001] and
Alesina and Glaeser [2004], shows mixed results in this empirical study. While
the electoral district magnitude variable shows the expected sign, that it does not
come in significant may raise suspicion with the perceptive reader. The usage of
a more sophisticated measure for electoral systems—by way of the electoral dis-
trict magnitude—and the inclusion of economic institutions, as well as the use
of instrumented two-stage regressions may have weakened the effect that recent
research would have expected.
3.4.4 An illustration: the institutional and ideological trans-
formation of the UK under Thatcher
Institutional path dependency is very strong in this sample of 18 countries. In
fact, there is only one country that has undergone a quantum institutional shift.
The transformation of the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher has no
equal. Around the 1970s—prior to the Thatcher government that ruled from
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1979 to 1990—the UK had the highest level of public sector employment in Eu-
rope [Knutsen, 2005]. The period that followed saw a sharp reduction in its
public sector (described in Dunleavy [1991]) and also the most significant decline
in union density in Europe: a staggering 42,5% drop from 1980 to 2000 [Kwon and
Pontusson, 2008]. Following Hall [2007, p.63], “The Thatcher government is the
exception that defines the limits ... It took on the trade unions and dramatically
reduced their power. However, Thatcher did so from a position of considerable
strength. Facing a divided opposition, she was electorally secure, and the British
trade union movement was not only divided but weakened by high levels of unem-
ployment.” In effect, with Thatcher’s leadership the UK became solidly classified
as a liberal market economy [Hall and Soskice, 2001].
As this paper would suggest, the median voter or electoral center also un-
derwent a shift. For the period of 1960-1980 the median voter averages at -10;
a strong left partisan preference in line with the arguments on labour organi-
zation and government employment. The subsequent period 1981-2001 sees the
UK median voter move to a slightly rightist position averaging at +1. Of course,
this begs the question on what came first: Was there a singular ideological shift
among the British voters that translated into these institutional changes, or did
the direction in causality originate from the long-lasting leadership by the Iron
Lady and the neo-liberal economic ideas that had captivated her Conservative
governments at the time? The econometrics applied in the above analysis opt
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for the latter sense of direction. The Thatcher era effectively turned around the
original institutional advantages in the UK to now favor the political odds of
the Conservative party. As a consequence, the Labour party had to re-invent
itself into “New” Labour as led by Tony Blair and universally understood to have
adopted a more liberal agenda than any other European social democratic party.
Given the changed institutional landscape, New Labour chased the re-orientation
of the median voter to being more rightist. While reneging on its blue-collar
roots, Tony Blair’s opportunistic leadership ensured the political survival of the
Labour party.
3.5 Conclusion
From the data, it appears that the UK provides the only test case where the polit-
ically aligned set of institutions underwent a quantum change. All other countries
in the sample have retained the institutional advantages to partisan politics that
came along with the original development of institutions. The structure of their
political economies generated political feedback effects that sustained distinctive
trajectories. The logic that results from this analysis is that parties can shape
voting behaviour by way of altering institutions. Equally, the institutions of the
political economy influence the positions that parties take by way of shaping the
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median voter over which parties compete.1
The results of this paper go against notions of all-pervasive ideologies that
would be exogenous and at the origin of different voting behaviour. Instead,
this paper aligns with the notion that “men are everywhere so alike” as the
philosopher David Hume would have it; or de gustibus non est disputandum as
Stigler and Becker [1977] titled their essay on the proposition that variation in
market conditions explains differences in behaviour rather than innate variation
in preferences. Similarly, this paper showed that variation in the institutional set-
up of a political economy explains variation in voting behaviour. Hence, instead
of relying on an ideological explanation for cross-national partisanship, this paper
suggests that it is a process where individuals adapt their political preferences to
their economic environment that leads to sustained cross-national differences in
voting behaviour.
1If voter preferences are to some degree endogenous to their political economy, then all
accounts taking voter preferences (or the left-right position of government) as exogenous are
open to questioning. This sweeping critique of a large chunk of the literature is, of course,
not novel. For example, Dunleavy [1991] made a strong swipe against taking voter preferences
as exogenously fixed and unaffected by their participation in a variety of processes. Dunleavy,
however, argues that voter preferences are to an extent endogenous to the exercise of state power
by parties. Combining Dunleavy’s insights—and those that have made similar arguments, e.g.
Evans and Andersen [2005]; Sanders et al. [2008]—with the empirical results of this paper, one
can make a strong case that voter preferences are being shaped from multiple angles and should
not be considered as exogenously given.
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Chapter 4
Ideological Change and the
Economics of Voting Behaviour
in the US, 1920-2008
Public-spiritedness is harder to inspire among people who feel they’re losing
ground.
—Robert Reich.
4.1 Introduction
Do long-term economic business cycles impact ideology and voting behaviour?
Would a prospering economy push aggregate voter preferences towards more ex-
pansionary government and the liberal left; and does a contracting economy lead
voters to favor smaller government and the conservative right? In short, is ideo-
logical change endogenous to variation in income growth rates?
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Surprisingly few scholars have dealt with this important question head-on.
Two reasons may possibly explain this lack of attention for what could well be a
fundamental dynamic in political economy. First, the pioneering work by Camp-
bell et al. [1960] and Lipset and Rokkan [1967] established models of voter pref-
erences that are determined by partisan affiliation or class and religious cleavages
in society. Later work augmented sociological sources with the ways in which
electoral systems [Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006] and eco-
nomic institutions [De Neve, 2009a; Iversen and Soskice, 2009] shape interests,
ideology, and voting behaviour. The result of these literatures, however, is a
rather static vision of ideological change. For voter ideology to change we would
need variation in sociological structures or electoral and economic institutions.
Because these variables are either hard to quantify or slow-moving, there have
been few attempts at better understanding ideological change.
Equally important may be that virtually all attention for the link between
economics and voting behaviour has been monopolized by short-term analyses
of how economic performance affects incumbency. Hence, from the outset, it is
important to distinguish the empirical and modeling effort in this paper from
the large literature denoted as “economic voting.” What is known as the eco-
nomic voting literature considers sociotropic and egocentric (or pocketbook) eco-
nomic effects on incumbent government approval and election outcomes [Alesina,
Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck,
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1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000]. This paper, however, studies how chang-
ing economic realities alter political ideology and voting behaviour over multiple
elections regardless of incumbency. In doing so, it adds to a small number of
prominent pieces that have also attempted to capture this fundamental dynamic
in political economy. No previous attempt, however, has been able to cover
as much ground, nor had access to the measure of voting behaviour presented
here. Because swings in ideology happen slowly, the importance of having multi-
generational time series cannot be overstated. This emphasis on long time series
and ideology distinguishes this research effort from the typical study in economic
voting that considers how economic conditions affect an incumbents chances for
reelection. While the term economic voting is generic enough to also apply to this
paper, it would have to be considered in a category distinct from the aforemen-
tioned accountability literature that has come to embody the notion of economic
voting.
It is also worthwhile noting from the outset that this is not a theory about
how rich or poor Americans vote. This work is preoccupied with how chang-
ing economic realities affect aggregate voting behaviour; this paper thus hopes to
gain understanding into the drivers of ideological change across the US electorate.
In his seminal piece “What moves policy sentiment?” Robert Durr [1993] was
the first to squarely tackle this deviously simple question. According to Durr,
shifts in US domestic policy sentiment on the liberal-conservative spectrum were
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a response to changing economic expectations. With expectations of a strong
economy producing greater support for liberal policies and declining economic
conditions shifting the policy mood to the right. Durr’s empirical analysis of
US policy sentiment revealed the existence of such ideological undercurrents re-
gardless of incumbency effects. In another prominent piece, Stevenson [2001] ex-
panded on Durr’s theory and conducted a comparative study of fourteen Western
democracies to also find that changes in aggregate voter preferences relate sys-
tematically to national economic performance. In similar vein, Kim and Fording
[2001], Markussen [2008], and Kayser [2007, 2009] explore the interaction between
economic conditions and electoral choice in a comparative setting and also point
to international economic sources of these seemingly domestic processes. Durr
[1993], however, was both the first and the last to take a close empirical look at
whether the ideology of the US public moves in sync with the domestic business
cycle. His analysis covered the years 1968-88, a relatively short period of time
to record what Durr himself described as a long-memoried, dynamic equilibrium
between the economy and policy mood that moves in long waves through time.
The dependent variable in Durr’s analysis was the notion of “policy sentiment,”
a measure devised by Stimson [1991] that aggregates hundreds of distinct US
public opinion surveys dealing with a multitude of different policy preferences.
When pooled together, Durr and Stimson argued, it becomes possible to con-
struct a single time series for the policy mood that gauges movement along a
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liberal-conservative continuum.
This paper expands and tests the theory originally proposed by Durr and
hopes to place the economics of voting behaviour at the heart of political econ-
omy. In the process, this work introduces a new time series to capture actual
voting behaviour, formalizes an income growth model, and runs empirical tests
that attempt to deal with the reverse causality of economic voting. The paper
starts with a quick overview of ideological change and voting behaviour in the
US since 1920 and introduces the median voter as our dependent variable. Next,
a reference-dependent utility model is discussed and the relationship between in-
come growth and voting behaviour is established. The logic and implications of
this model are compared with the standard redistributive model of voter pref-
erences. An empirical analysis that considers reverse causality is carried out for
disposable income growth and the results of this research are discussed before the
paper concludes.
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4.2 Ideological change and voting behaviour in
the US, 1920-2008
4.2.1 The median voter data set
In order to quantify ideological change and voting behaviour this paper turns to
the concept of the median voter. Ever since the seminal works by Black [1948] and
Downs [1957] established the concept of the median voter, or the ideological center
of the electorate, it has figured widely across literatures. This paper introduces a
new median voter data set that is detailed in a separate research note [De Neve,
2009c]. The data employs the statistics provided by the Comparative Manifesto
Project1 Budge et al. [2001]; Klingemann et al. [2006] but corrects for stochastic
error as done by Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009].2
1The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) codified all sentences of every election man-
ifesto to place parties on a left-right scale. The scaling consists in subtracting the sum of
percentage references to categories grouped as left from the sum of percentage references to
categories grouped as right. The manifesto data is collected such that each statement is as-
signed to either a pro-left or a pro-right category. Consequently, negative scores represent a
generally left position, whereas positive scores are reflective of a right position. Results range
between -100 (extreme left) and +100 (extreme right).
2Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] detail the inherently stochastic processes of manifesto
authorship and manifesto coding for which the CMP does not provide error estimates. The
absence of estimates of measurement uncertainty in the CMP data is troublesome and lowers
the scientific quality of its statistics as well as the research that builds upon it. Treating
words as data with error, Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] proceed by bootstrapping the
analysis of every coded manifesto. By way of these simulations they reconstruct the stochastic
processes that generated these political texts. In doing so they are able to estimate degrees
of non-systematic error for the thousands of manifestos coded by the CMP. The use of these
error estimates allows for better empirical and theoretical inferences from the CMP data. The
bootstrapping work by Benoit et al (2009) also allows for generating new data estimates of
party policy positions. The alternative estimate for a party policy position then becomes the
mean estimator of the 1,000 bootstrap simulations that were drawn for each manifesto. This
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In essence, the position of the median voter is computed from vote shares for
the ideologically ranked parties; a methodology spearheaded by Kim and Fording
[1998]. This is done by first ranking the parties by ideological score for every
election through textual analysis of party documents. Then for each party the
interval where its supporters are located is tabulated by locating the midpoints
between the ideologically neighboring parties. Assuming that voters choose the
candidate or party that is ideologically closest to them, a party will attract the
votes of those that are part of the interval that surrounds that party. The assump-
tion that voting behaviour is an expression of ideological beliefs is common [Coate
and Conlin, 2004; Mullainathan and Washington, 2009]. Still, it is important to
underscore that this assumption implies a disregard of the part of the electorate
that may vote strategically rather than ideologically.1 Finally, the electoral re-
sults for each party at every election are matched to produce the percentage of
the electorate that is grouped into each ideological interval. As Kim and Ford-
ing [2003] point out, this methodology requires us “to conceive of elections as
large-scale opinion polls.” Where the ballot acts as a survey in which the subject
chooses the party that is ideologically closest on the partisan left-right spectrum.
As such, it is possible to treat election results as a grouped frequency distribution
new data for party policy positions calibrates for stochastic error in the CMP. De Neve [2009c]
adopts these corrected party policy positions in order to construct a new median voter data
set.
1Stevenson [2001] notes that estimates of the importance of strategic voting rarely attain
10%.
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and tabulate a median statistic. The results range between -100 (extreme left)
and +100 (extreme right) and non-election values are interpolated linearly.1 De
Neve [2009c] provides details on the precise tabulations and assumptions that
were involved to build these new median voter statistics and extends the data to
include over 50 democracies. It is important to highlight that the median voter
statistics are derived indirectly via party policy positions and their success at
the election polls, rather than direct evidence of voter opinions. Notwithstanding
these limitations, the median voter data presented here are unique in their range
and detail. Moreover, as compared to self-placement surveys, this methodology
ties in actual voting behaviour which leaves opinion polling data more appropri-
ately coined as “median citizen” instead of “median voter”.
The methodology to construct these median voter statistics underwent ro-
bustness checks carried out by, among others, Powell [2000] and McDonald and
Budge [2005]. Table 4.1 compares the US median voter data used in this paper
with alternative measures from the American National Elections Studies (ANES),
Kim and Fording [2003], and Ellis and Stimson [2009]. Table 4.2 presents corre-
lation coefficients between these measures. The Kim and Fording [2003] measure
for the US median voter also builds on the CMP statistics but does not correct
1Interpolating values for the in-between election years is far from ideal. Still, it is not
unreasonable to assume that ideological sentiment moves gradually between elections rather
than in a haphazard fashion. The appendix also provides the empirical analysis using the
median voter data without interpolating non-election values. The empirical claims of this
paper remain equally significant.
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for stochastic error and applies a ratio method instead of a subtractive method
to tabulate party positions. The ANES measure of party identification is a bi-
annual survey that gauges whether respondents think of themselves as Democrat,
Independent, or Republican on a 7-point scale. The ANES liberal/conservative
measure is a bi-annual survey that gauges whether respondents think of them-
selves as liberal, moderate, or conservative on a 7-point scale. The Ellis and
Stimson [2009] measure is a compiled and integrated time series of historical and
more recent self-identification surveys on whether respondents think of themselves
as liberal or conservative.
Table 4.1: Comparison with alternative voter ideology measures
Name Availability N Range Mean SD Min Max
US Median Voter 1920-2008 89 -100/100 8.2 6.6 -7.8 20.9
De Neve [2009c]
US Median Voter 1945-2003 59 0/100 48.9 9.5 35.5 66.1
Kim and Fording [2003]
Party identification 1952-2008 28 1/7 3.6 0.2 3.3 4.0
(ANES)
Lib/Cons identification 1972-2008 18 1/7 4.3 0.1 4.1 4.5
(ANES)
Lib/Cons identification 1937-2006 70 0/100 39.3 4.2 31.8 46.3
Ellis and Stimson [2009]
Of course, in order to measure ideological change in the US one could simply
take the variation in electoral success between Democrat and Republican candi-
dates over time. To do so, however, would be a mistake as it would falsely assume
82
Table 4.2: Alternative voter ideology measures correlations table
Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) US Median Voter De Neve [2009c] 1.00
(2) US Median Voter Kim and Fording [2003] 0.60 1.00
(3) Party identification (ANES) 0.77 0.66 1.00
(4) Lib/Cons identification (ANES) 0.08 0.40 0.49 1.00
(5) Lib/Cons ID Ellis and Stimson [2009] 0.51 0.74 0.56 0.61 1.00
Note: To facilitate interpretation, the Kim and Fording [2003] and Ellis and
Stimson [2009] measures were inversed to obtain data that would also increase
when indicating a rise in conservatism.
that the ideological position of either party has not altered over time. Combin-
ing electoral success with an in-depth analysis of party documents since 1920
allows for a sophisticated measure of voting behaviour and ideological change
that incorporates voter and party dynamics.
4.2.2 The United States, 1920-2008
For the United States only, the election documents going back as far as 1920
have been coded. Moreover, a special effort was made to code the most recent
2008 election documents.1 The result is a unique view of the evolution of voting
behaviour in the United States as shown in Figure 4.1. The ANES party self-
identification measure is added on from when it became available (1952), as well
as a polynomial trend line to show the general trend in voting behaviour between
1Ian Budge (University of Essex) and Judith Bara (QMUL) are to be thanked for their
efforts and approval of early release.
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1920 and 2008 in the US.
In line with conventional wisdom it shows the US to be generally rightist or
conservative. The one time that the US public enters leftist territory is between
1945-50 when, in the wake of the Roosevelt years, Truman finds fertile ground to
introduce the Fair Deal that implements a large number of social and economic
reforms; including the Housing Act of 1949, an expansion of social security, as
well as the first call for universal healthcare. On the international front this less
conservative period shows in the large economic aid programs as symbolized by
the Marshall Plan. Soon thereafter, however, the US gradually returns to being
increasingly more conservative with support for Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and
Bush Sr. The elections of Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter do not indicate a turn-
ing of the ideological tide though the Kennedy to Johnson and Carter years show
a softening conservatism. The mid-eighties see another quantum leap in the con-
servatism of the American public and culminates with the electoral victory of Bill
Clinton who rode the conservative wave on a platform that heralded “the era of
big government is over” and promoted fiscal conservatism. The conservativeness
of the US electorate drops slightly throughout the second term of the Clinton
years and the 2000 election of Bush Jr. However, towards the 2004 re-election of
Bush Jr., we note an upswing in conservatism that gradually peels off when we
head for the Obama presidency.
What drives these changes in voter sentiment? In his influential contribution,
84
Figure 4.1: The US Median Voter, 1920-2008
85
Durr [1993] argued that these broad shifts in ideological sentiment represent re-
sponses to changing economic conditions. Before testing this logic empirically,
we describe a utility-based model that establishes a relationship between income
growth and voting behaviour by way of the demand for public goods and the
optimal tax rate.
4.3 The economics of voting behaviour
4.3.1 An income growth model
The logic of the model presented here can be traced back as far as Wicksell
[1896] who also considered individuals that allocate their resources between pri-
vate goods and public goods. The allocation or substitution mechanism for these
competing supplies of goods is the rate of taxation and the democratic process
allows for a decision. As such, the resulting rate of taxation is chosen by the
decisive or median voter who maximizes utility derived from private and public
goods given an income constraint. This voter utility model is similar to the text-
book model in consumer choice with an individual deriving utility from a convex
combination of two bundles of goods subject to a budget constraint that is their
personal income. In this voter utility model there are the private goods procured
by disposable (post-tax) private income, and there are public goods procured
by tax revenue. Public goods are understood in the largest possible sense as
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comprising all public goods and services provided by government including edu-
cation, social security, healthcare, utilities, parks, policing, and national defense.
This view of public goods is purposely larger than the definition employed by, for
example, Meltzer and Richard [1981] who limit government to a redistributive
function only.
Given varying marginal utility, individuals will alter their preferred mix of
private and public goods to maximize utility with changes in income. This logic
was first applied to policy sentiment by Durr [1993] and formalized by Kayser
[2009]. Both authors assumed diminishing marginal utility on income and linear
marginal utility on public goods. This paper extends variation in policy sentiment
to behaviour at the voting booth and relaxes the assumption of linear marginal
utility on public goods in proposition 2. As the preferred mix of private and
public goods changes so does the optimal tax rate that allows for substitution
between private and public goods. The way to express preferences on the supply
of public goods and the tax rate is to vote for a candidate or party program that
would advance those preferences. If the median voter perceives leftist parties as
being associated with expansionary government, then a prospering economy with
rising income growth will proportionally increase the demand for public goods
which translates into more electoral support for the liberal left. Conversely, if
the median voter associates parties of the right with lower taxation and smaller
government, then a dismal economy that depresses income growth rates will make
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voters less willing to sponsor public goods and generate more electoral support
for the conservative right. It is commonplace to associate leftist parties with
higher taxation and expansionary government and parties of the right with lower
taxation and smaller government [Downs, 1957; Hibbs, 1987; Huber and Inglehart,
1995; Iversen and Soskice, 2006].1
In order to formalize a voter preferences model that considers income growth,
not levels of income, this paper taps into the literature on reference-dependent
utility models that derive utility gains and losses from standard consumption
utility models with reference points determined endogenously [Koszegi and Rabin,
2006, 2009]. The intuition behind reference-dependent models originates in the
work of Kahneman and Tversky [1979] who show that the outcome of a choice is
not only shaped by absolute values but also by comparison with a reference point.
An economic reference point that voters will have come to expect is the income
growth rate of the previous year. Standard economic voting models typically
equate the reference point with the status quo level of income. However, following
Koszegi and Rabin [2006] “when expectations and the status quo are different—a
common situation in economic environments—equating the reference point with
expectations generally makes better predictions.”
1A different, and perhaps more intuitive way of relating the logic of this income growth
model would be to suggest that in good economic times it is less painful having to part income
for the collection of taxes and the provision of public goods. Dire economic times, however,
make it particularly painful to pay taxes and will make a campaign promise to reduce taxes all
the more appealing.
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We can represent a simple reference-dependent voter utility model as the sum
of the utility gains or losses on disposable personal income growth and tax revenue
growth.1 Formally, with linear utility on public goods,
Uv = [(1− τ) ∆y]α + τ ∆y (1− δ) | α, δ, τ < 1
where the first term captures the utility gains from income growth (∆y) after taxes
(τ) or disposable personal income growth with which to procure private goods.
The second term represents the utility gains derived from public goods that are
financed by tax revenue. A parameter to capture the inefficiency of taxation is
included (1− δ). Income growth is subject to diminishing marginal utility, hence
the first term is raised to a fractional exponent (α).2 Solving the first-order
condition for the optimal level of taxation (τ ∗) gives the below proposition with
proof in appendix.
Proposition 1. With linear marginal utility of public goods, the optimal level of
taxation increases with rising income growth as given by
τ ∗ = 1− α
α−1(1− δ) 1α−1
∆y
1Of course, the absolute level of personal income will play its role in generating utility to
voters. The research presented in this paper, however, is pre-occupied with the explanatory
power of income growth rates rather than absolute income levels. Comparable work in political
economy typically looks at growth rates when considering personal income, GDP, unemploy-
ment, or inflation, instead of absolute levels of those macroeconomic indicators.
2This voter utility model is different from the modeling effort by Kayser [2009] in that it
dispenses with the arbitrary weighting parameter on public goods and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, it is expressed in terms of income growth by relying on the logic of reference-dependent
utility models.
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When income growth ∆y rises, the optimal level of taxation τ ∗ also rises. This
optimization result on taxation nicely illustrates the above logic and provides
a dynamic link for the relationship between changing economic conditions and
policy sentiment that Durr [1993] first described.
When we release the assumption of linear marginal utility on public goods
and raise the second term to a fractional exponent (ε) we obtain the following
voter utility model1
Uv = [(1− τ) ∆y]α + [τ ∆y (1− δ)]ε | δ, τ, α, ε < 1
Solving the first-order condition for the optimal level of taxation (τ ∗) and the
implicit derivative (dτ
dy
) gives the following proposition with proof in appendix.
Proposition 2. If the marginal utility of public goods is sufficiently greater than
the marginal utility of disposable income growth (ε > α) then the optimal level of
taxation increases with rising income growth as given by
α2
ε2(1−δ)ε∆y
α
ε
−1
{(1− α) τ − (1− ε) (1− τ)} τε−2(1−τ)α−2
[(1−τ)α−1]2
The sign on dτ
d∆y
depends on the term {(1− α) τ − (1− ε) (1− τ)}, hence
1This voter utility model is different from the modeling effort by Kayser [2009] in that it
allows for an exponential utility function on both income growth and public goods. This model
also dispenses with the arbitrary weighting parameter on public goods and is expressed in terms
of income growth.
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dτ
d∆y
> 0⇔ (1− α) τ − (1− ε) (1− τ) > 0
α<1,ε<1⇔ (1− α)
(1− ε)
τ
(1− τ) > 1
For this condition to hold it is sufficient that ε > α as long as τ > 1/2. As
τ decreases, the ratio ε/α needs to increase for dτ
d∆y
to remain positive. The case
where marginal utility of public goods (ε) is greater than the marginal utility of
disposable income growth (α) would be common. First, because personal income
precedes the possibility of financing public goods, those public goods will be at
an earlier stage on their utility function relative to income. Second, demand for
public goods and services has been shown to be income elastic, a regularity known
as Wagner’s Law [Lamartina and Zaghini, 2008].1
4.3.2 Income growth, taxation, and voting behaviour
Figure 4.2 plots the key variables of this voter utility model over time. Variable
definitions and sources are available in the appendix. Disposable income growth
1Alternatively, as Stevenson [2001] observes, a slightly different logic from the above would
lead to the same conclusion. If voters perceive leftist policies as luxury goods relative to right-
ist policies, then an individual will maximize her utility by advancing leftist policies when her
personal income rises and rightist policies when income decreases. This logic circumvents the
assumption that leftist parties and their policies have to be perceived as generating more ex-
pensive public goods as compared to rightist policies. An assumption that could be empirically
problematic given that spending priorities by conservative governments have, at times, led to
greater levels of public spending than liberal governments [Galbraith, 2008].
91
and the tax rate track each other well, as hypothesized in the above model. A
continued rise in income growth rates through the early 1980s is accompanied by
a similar rise in the median tax rate. This trend reverses sharply after 1985 with
income growth values and the tax rate either dropping or leveling. As income
growth contracts, the median voter experiences increased marginal utility from
personal income, whereas taxation will be perceived as evermore painful, thus the
median voter is likely to become less supportive of taxation and public spending.
Following the above logic, this model leads us to expect that the ideological center
of the US electorate will have shifted rightward from the mid-eighties onwards as
income growth depresses.
Adding the median voter data visualizes the principal claim of this paper;
that ideological change is endogenous to variation in income growth rates. As
Figure 4.2 and the polynomial trend lines show, the ideological center of the elec-
torate joins income growth rates in a long-run trend. While income growth rates
increase the electorate becomes more liberal, or to put it more appropriately in
the case of the US, the electorate votes less conservative. Conversely, when income
growth rates stagnate or contract, voting behaviour turns more conservative.
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Figure 4.2: The Economics of Voting behaviour: Income Growth, Taxation, and
Voting behaviour
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4.3.3 The income growth model and the redistributive
model
It is worthwhile observing that the above voter model is a departure from influen-
tial work developed by Romer [1975] and Meltzer and Richard [1981], and applied
by, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [1994] and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
[2006]. In essence, they model taxation and public spending as the result of re-
distributive demands by below median income voters. As Pontusson and Rueda
[forthcoming] also observe, virtually all of the voter models in political economy
have taken the redistributive model as a point of departure.
The redistributive model and the income growth model developed here rely
on three similar assumptions. First, both models imply a two-step mechanism
where an individual first has to part with money at tax time before being returned
funds through redistributive processes or reap the benefit from public goods.
Preferences over the desired level of taxation are evaluated at each election in
function of where the voter’s income ranks in society or in function of the voter’s
income growth and related change in the demand for public goods. Second,
both models require that voters perceive the level of taxation to be positively
correlated with levels of redistribution and provision of public goods. Finally, the
redistributive and income growth models assume that voters mainly care about
their socio-economic situation. If other issues, such as religion, are meaningfully
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salient to voters it will disturb the logic of these uni-dimensional models [Roemer,
1998].
While both models rely on similar assumptions, there are important differ-
ences and these may result in opposing effects on political preferences and optimal
taxation. First, as mentioned before, for the income growth model the function of
the state is defined as providing public goods and services with the tax revenue it
collects. These are understood in the broadest possible sense. The redistributive
voter model limits government to a redistributive function and voter’s minds are
pre-occupied with calculating whether they will be a net contributor or recipient
at the end of the redistributive process. As such, in the most basic version of
the redistributive model, below median-income voters would have an incentive
to support 100% taxation whereas the above median-income voter would prefer
no taxation. Second, the suggested effect of income growth on voter preferences
holds across the electorate. Broad-based income growth will have a population-
wide effect on the demand for public goods and, hence, political preferences. The
redistributive model does not suggest a universal effect across the voting popula-
tion but splits the electorate into opposing camps with half that favors taxation
and the other half that does not.
Of course, a comparison between the redistributive model and the income
growth model developed in this paper is not ideal in that the latter is reference-
dependent and thus dynamic, whereas the redistributive model is essentially
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static. Still, a dynamic read of the redistributive model implies, in the words
of McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal [2006], that “[I]n a responsive democracy, more
inequality should typically lead to more redistribution.” In terms of ideological
change this would mean that increasing inequality moves the median voter fur-
ther left in order to drive support for higher levels of taxation and redistributive
spending. The logic of the income growth model presented in this paper implies
the opposite conclusion: a leftist policy agenda will be most successful when ris-
ing income growth is equally spread. Income growth that is limited to the few
is projected to have less impact on the demand for public goods and resulting
voting behaviour.1
Notwithstanding a dramatic rise in inequality in the US over the past three
decades, the US voting public has become more conservative by any ideological
measure. The redistributive model failed to predict this conservative trend in
voting behaviour. Many scholars set out to explain this empirical conundrum,
coined the “paradox of redistribution” or “Robin Hood paradox,” by pointing to
non-economic policy issues [Roemer, 1998], beliefs on social mobility and fairness
[Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2006; Benabou and Ok,
1It is left to future research to extend this analysis cross-nationally and evaluate whether
different levels of inequality moderate the effect of income growth on voting behaviour. A
preliminary conjecture would be that ceteris paribus societies with less inequality will have
seen a steeper rise in leftist voting as income growth accelerated through the eighties and a
sharper conservative turn as income growth decelerated from the mid-eighties onwards. The
opposite logic is suggested for societies with high levels of inequality where income growth is
less widespread and will thus generate a softened effect on voting behaviour.
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2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Piketty, 1995], group loyalties and social identity
[Klor and Shayo, 2010; Luttmer, 2001], or political pressures from the top out-
weighing pressure for redistribution from the bottom as low-income citizens are
less likely to vote or are not entitled to vote [Barnes, 2007; McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal, 2006; Pontusson and Rueda, forthcoming]. A number of scholars of-
fered alternative models to explain pressures for redistribution and partisanship
by focussing in on electoral systems, coalitions, and organized labor [Bradley
et al., 2003; Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009]. Others reasoned that demand for
insurance rises with income [Moene and Wallerstein, 2003], and still others state
that “our goal is to rescue the idea that income inequality is not only shaped by
politics, but also shapes politics”[Pontusson and Rueda, forthcoming].
The below empirical analysis gauges the influence of income growth rates on
voting behaviour and includes an updated measure of inequality by Piketty and
Saez [2003]. Contrary to the intuitive logic of the redistributive model, the results
indicate that public spending does not “result from the difference between the
distribution of votes and the distribution of income” [Meltzer and Richard, 1981].
On the other hand, variation in income growth rates does provide explanatory
power for the demand for public spending and voting behaviour in the US.1
1It is important to note that the income growth and redistributive models are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, their logic may well be complementary and the cognitive processes operating
simultaneously in the minds of voters. There is, of course, a strong negative utility associated
with having to part with personal income at tax time. But the pain caused by taxation may
be mitigated if times are more prosperous then before and also if one realizes that he or she
may end up being a net benefactor of the redistributive system. The joint or net effect of these
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4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Reverse causality
Very little research on economic voting has attempted to deal with the possibility
that voting may also impact economics. Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs [1997] first
raised the endogeneity issue and showed that the estimated effects of economic
perceptions on vote choice were substantially less than originally produced in
the widely cited work by Lewis-Beck [1988]. If voting behaviour influences the
economic variables then using OLS estimations will inflate the economic effect
on voter ideology. A case in point would be recent work by Bartels [2009] that
shows significant economic effects on income growth and inequality when either
a Democrat or Republican government is in power. Benign neglect of this reverse
causality may have increased our understanding of how economic realities affect
voting behaviour but statistical analyses may be biased. Not unlike the proverbial
chicken and egg problem, is there a serious risk to attribute ideological change to
variation in economic performance if, in fact, ideological change and the resulting
voting behaviour may have influenced economic performance in the first place.
The use of one or more valid instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) regression allows for the estimation of causal relationships in the presence
processes may be key in shaping the vote decision of an individual. It is left to future research
to develop these ideas more formally and test them empirically.
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of endogenous explanatory variables. The instrument cannot be correlated with
the dependent variable (exclusion) but should be highly correlated with the en-
dogenous explanatory variable for which it instruments (relevance). If so, than a
2SLS regression allows for consistent estimation [Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
son, 2001; Heckman, 2008]. This paper proposes to use net income growth per
head in the OECD (minus the US) as instrument for the variation in US disposable
income growth. With increasing economic interdependence, a great number of
scholars have established that domestic economic performance moves in sync with
international economic fluctuations, or that international business cycles may ac-
tually induce covariation across domestic business cycles [Campbell and Mankiw,
1989; Kose, Otrok and Whiteman, 2003]. Hence, it is expected that net income
growth rates for the OECD will be strongly correlated with income growth in the
US. Kayser [2009] takes this logic one step further and shows that international
business cycles influence domestic economic performance which, in turn, induces
domestic electoral choice. As such, Kayser concludes that the cross-national suc-
cess of left and right parties over time is best characterized by “partisan waves”
that originate from international economic sources.1
The validity of the 2SLS results relies on the assumption that international
business cycles have an indirect effect on US voting behaviour by way of US do-
1Quite a number of OECD member states do not have time series on net income growth
that predates 1970. The 2SLS analysis thus has a lower limit at 1970.
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mestic business cycles. A screening of the first-stage results of the 2SLS models
shows that economic indicators for the OECD (minus the US) are relevant instru-
ments for their US domestic counterparts. In fact, net income growth per head in
the OECD (minus the US) correlates at 0.88 with US disposable income growth
figures, and the first-stage regression coefficients on OECD income growth, and
their first differences, obtain p-values inferior to 0.01. The instrumented analysis
produces an F-statistic of 5.33 [Stock and Yogo, 2005].
4.4.2 Empirical model
Having seen in Figure 4.2 that ideological change and disposable income growth
appear to move in sync over time, we can now turn to a statistical analysis that
considers reverse causality and controls for other possible determinants of voting
behaviour.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests suggest the presence of non-stationary
or integrated variables. In similar fashion to Durr [1993] and Kayser [2009], we
turn to a general error correction model (ECM) as the most appropriate way to
proceed. Practically, the ECM is given by:1
1Theoretically, the ECM is given by:
∆Yt = α+ β∆Xt + δ(Yt−1 −Xt−1γ) + t
where the error correction term measures the distance from equilibrium that variables move
following changes and the time it takes to return to equilibrium. For more info on the ECM
please refer to DeBoef and Keele [2008].
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∆Yt = α + β1Yt−1 + β2∆Xt + β3Xt−1 + β4∆Zt + t
where ∆Yt is the dependent variable, ideological change in the position of the US
median voter, in year t. ∆Yt is regressed on its lagged level Yt−1. ∆Yt is also
regressed on both the first difference and the lagged level of the co-integrated
independent variable Xt, in this case US disposable personal income growth rates.
A one year lag for income growth rates is used and a 4-year lag of the median
voter is used to capture dynamics that span another election. Zt are additional
controls, here a measure for inequality1 and US defense spending as a percentage
of GDP2. The appendix reproduces the analysis using additional controls for
inflation, voter turnout, and presidential approval rates. Variable definitions and
sources are also listed in the appendix.
4.4.3 Results
Table 4.3 shows the results of ordinary and instrumented error correction models
that test the hypothesis that variation in personal income growth predicts ideo-
1A measure for inequality by Piketty and Saez [2003] is included to control for its possible
influence on voting behaviour as suggested by, among others, Meltzer and Richard [1981] and
more recently by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal [2006]. The latter authors also show that
inequality and the polarization of the US electorate are tightly correlated (r = 0.93), hence
including inequality as a control also serves the purpose of covering the political polarization
of the US public.
2US defense spending as a percentage of GDP is included to capture non-economic factors
that may influence ideological change. Durr [1993] used dummies for the Vietnam War, Wa-
tergate, Iran hostage crisis, and Iran-Contra affair. Kayser [2009] used troop levels in Europe
as a control in his cross-national study.
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Table 4.3: Ordinary and 2SLS error correction models on ideological change in
the US (1950-2008).
∆Median voter OLS ∆Median voter 2SLS
Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value
∆IncomeGrowth -0.22 0.09 0.017 -0.42 0.18 0.020
IncomeGrowtht−1 -0.28 0.11 0.013 -0.36 0.16 0.024
Medianvotert−4 -0.32 0.04 0.000 -0.34 0.10 0.001
Defensespending -0.31 0.12 0.012 -0.51 0.44 0.245
Inequality 0.12 0.06 0.047 0.09 0.08 0.262
Intercept 2.39 3.43 0.489 5.38 5.53 0.330
N 58 36
R-squared 0.57 0.33
F statistic 5.33
Note: Variable definitions are in the appendix. The 2SLS instruments are the
first differences and a one-year lag of disposable income growth rates in the OECD
countries minus the US (1970-2008). Regression coefficients with standard errors
(SE) and P-values are presented.
logical change. Both the OLS and 2SLS models show that increases in disposable
personal income growth rates are significantly associated with more leftist or lib-
eral voting behaviour in the US. This is the case for the one-year lagged income
growth rates (OLS p = 0.013 and 2SLS p = 0.024), as well as for the first differ-
ences that capture short-run effects (OLS p = 0.017 and 2SLS p = 0.020). These
results provide strong support for the logic behind the income growth model:
an increase in personal income growth rates generates a relative increase in the
demand for public goods and liberal policies, resulting in a leftward shift of the
US median voter.
Also of interest is that the measure for inequality and defense spending as
a percentage of US GDP come in significant, though both variables loose their
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significance once we control for reverse causality in the 2SLS model. Note that
inequality is positively associated with conservative changes in the position of the
US median voter, contrary to the intuitive logic of the Meltzer-Richard model.
The 4-year lagged median voter position is negatively associated with current
ideological change which would appear to indicate a tendency to somewhat revert
ideological course at every new election.
Additional statistical analyses reproduced in the appendix include controls
for inflation, voter turnout, and presidential approval rates, as well as median
voter data that is not interpolated. The results reported above are robust to
these adaptations of the error correction model and coefficients on income growth
variables remain significant.1
4.4.4 Fitting predicted model values: a retrospective
Figure 4.3 plots the predicted values from the OLS error correction model on
actual data for US ideological change as measured by the annual change in the
1A unique feature of this paper is that it considers personal income growth statistics instead
of the usual macroeconomic suspects that are GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation rates.
Income is an obvious fit given that the income growth model presented above hinges on the
utility of personal income and the willingness to fund public goods. Still, the few other papers
that have elaborated on this logic considered either the usual economic indicators [Kayser, 2009;
Markussen, 2008; Stevenson, 2001]. In appendix, Table 4.7 presents the results of ordinary and
2SLS error correction models analogous to Table 4.3 with GDP growth, unemployment, and
inflation as explanatory variables. In line with personal income growth rates, the GDP growth
variables are also negatively associated with ∆MedianV oter and the lagged GDP growth rate
(GDPgrowtht−1) is statistically significant. This indicates, once again, that good economic
times go hand-in-hand with leftward ideological shifts. This result on GDP growth is verified
when introducing the respective OECD data instrumental variables though the low R-squared
and F-statistic cast doubt over the validity of this result.
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ideological position of the US median voter. On the basis of 4-year old electoral
data and up-to-date information on disposable income, defense spending, and
inequality, this model tracks ideological change in the US fairly well.1
4.5 Conclusion
The US median voter tends to advance a more liberal policy agenda when eco-
nomic times are good and turns more conservative when the economic situation
deteriorates. Error correction models of disposable income growth show it to
be a strong predictor of ideological change even after controlling for other possi-
ble sources of voting behaviour (Defensespending, Inequality, V oterTurnout,
PresidentApproval) and reverse causality.
That income growth influences voting behaviour can be easily understood
if one considers a reference-dependent utility model that is similar in set-up as
the standard consumer choice model with competing goods. Given diminishing
marginal utility on income growth, individuals will alter their preferred mix of
private and public goods to maximize utility with changes in income. If the
1A model built on historical data provides no guarantee for future accuracy. Still, it is an en-
tertaining exercise to contemplate the direction our model would suggest for ideological change
in the near future. With a deep recession, high unemployment, and slow economic recovery
at hand this model would predict the American electorate to have become more conservative,
skeptical of public spending, and less inclined to advance public goods such as pro-environment
regulation. Hence, unless the Democratic Party or candidate adopts a more rightward policy
agenda, we would expect the Republican candidate to pick up more votes in 2012 as compared
to 2008.
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Figure 4.3: Fitting predicted values on US ideological change, 1950-2008
105
median voter perceives leftist parties as being associated with expansionary gov-
ernment, then a prospering economy with rising disposable income growth will
proportionally increase the demand for public goods which translates into more
electoral support for the liberal left. Conversely, if the median voter associates
parties of the right with smaller government, then a dismal economy that de-
presses income growth will make voters less willing to sponsor public goods and
generate more electoral support for the conservative right. The optimization re-
sults of the utility-based model presented in this paper provide a dynamic link for
the fundamental relationship between changing economic conditions and policy
sentiment that Durr [1993] first described. The empirical tests leave no doubt
about the strength of that relationship.
The alignment of theory with empirical realities is what has plagued the redis-
tributive model from the start. Still, the intuitive appeal of voting behaviour as a
function of redistributive demands and inequality has turned the model into the
predominant starting point when considering the economics of voting behaviour.
The logic and results of the income growth model presented in this paper may
complement recent iterations of the redistributive model and alternative models
to develop a better understanding of voting behaviour.
The general lesson to be drawn from this work is that ideological change in
the US is endogenous to variation in disposable income growth rates. This result
nicely complements the finding in De Neve [2009a] that the left-right ideological
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position of a country is endogenous to the variety of economic institutions that
make up their respective political economy. With both the ideological position
and ideological change endogenous to economic realities, it is impossible to deny
the pervasive and long-run impact of economics on voting behaviour.
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4.6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
With linear marginal utility of public goods, the optimal level of taxation increases
with rising income growth.
Uv = [(1− τ) ∆y]α + τ ∆y (1− δ) | α, δ, τ < 1
FOC
dUv
dτ
= (1− δ)∆y − α ∆y((1− τ)∆y)α−1 = 0
α ∆y((1− τ)∆y)α−1 = (1− δ)∆y
If ∆y 6= 0, α 6= 0,
((1− τ)∆y)α−1 = (1− δ)
α
τ ∗ = 1− α
α−1(1− δ) 1α−1
∆y
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Proof of proposition 2
If the marginal utility of public goods is sufficiently larger than marginal utility
of disposable income growth (ε > α) then the optimal level of taxation increases
with rising income growth.
Uv = [(1− τ) ∆y]α + [τ ∆y (1− δ)]ε | δ, τ, α, ε < 1 and α < ε
FOC
dUv
dτ
= −α∆y[(1− τ)∆y]α−1 + ε∆y (1− δ) [τ∆y(1− δ)]ε−1 = 0
τ ε−1
(1− τ)α−1 =
α∆yα
ε [(1− δ) ∆y]ε
=
α
ε (1− δ)ε∆y
α
ε
Implicit derivative
F (τ,∆y) =
τ ε−1
(1− τ)α−1 −
α
ε (1− δ)ε∆y
α
ε = 0
dτ
d∆y
= −F∆y
Fτ
= −
− α2
ε2(1−δ)ε∆y
α
ε
−1
(ε−1)τε−2(1−τ)α−1−(α−1)(1−τ)α−2τε−1
[(1−τ)α−1]2
=
α2
ε2(1−δ)ε∆y
α
ε
−1
{(1− α) τ − (1− ε) (1− τ)} τε−2(1−τ)α−2
[(1−τ)α−1]2
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Descriptive statistics
Table 4.4: Variable properties
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
MedianV oter 89 8.23 6.54 -7.77 20.91
IncomeGrowth 59 7.09 2.52 2.2 12.6
GDPgrowth 59 3.41 2.31 -1.9 8.7
Unemployment 59 5.61 1.46 2.9 9.7
Inflation 59 3.80 3.05 -2.08 13.91
OECD.Income 37 6.35 2.58 2.35 11.66
OECD.GDPgrowth 38 7.00 2.93 3.02 12.86
OECD.Unemployment 44 5.86 2.05 2.57 8.97
OECD.Inflation 38 6.83 3.40 2.37 14.86
Defensespending 59 6.45 2.76 3.00 14.2
Inequality 91 39.22 5.37 32.31 49.74
Turnout 61 55.71 4.11 48.9 62.8
PresidentApproval 59 55.78 13.35 23 84
Taxrate 54 14.06 3.02 7.35 18.44
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Table 4.5: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition and source
MedianV oter The ideological center of the electorate; ranges
from -100 (extreme left/liberal) to +100 (extreme
right/conservative). Source: De Neve [2009c].
IncomeGrowth The annual percent change in US disposable personal in-
come in current dollars (code A067RP1). Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
GDPgrowth The annual percent change in US real gross domestic
product. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Unemployment The yearly US unemployment rate from the employment
status of the civilian noninstitutional population. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Inflation The inflation rate or the annual percent change in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
OECD.Income The annual percent change in net national income per
head for the OECD minus the US (in current dollars).
Source: OECD.
OECD.GDPgrowth The annual percent change in real gross domestic product
(in current dollars) for the OECD minus the US. Source:
OECD.
OECD.Unemployment The yearly unemployment rate in the OECD minus the
US. Source: OECD.
OECD.Inflation The inflation rate or the annual percent change in con-
sumer prices in the OECD minus the US (base year =
2005). Source: OECD.
Defensespending The annual national defense outlays as a percentage of
GDP. Source: OMB (The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009,
Historical Tables).
Inequality The top-10 percent fractile income share (including cap-
ital gains) in the US. Source: Piketty and Saez [2003].
Turnout Voter turnout rate at presidential elections based on
voting-age population. Source: McDonald and Popkin
[2001].
PresidentApproval Presidential approval rate at start of each year. Source:
Gallup.
Taxrate The average and marginal combined federal income and
employee social security and medicare (FICA) tax rate for
four-person families at the same relative positions in the
income distribution (median income). Source: Treasury
Department (through 1996); Tax Policy Center (1997-
2008).
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Table 4.6: Additional OLS and 2SLS error correction models on ideological change
in the US (1950-2008).
∆Median voter ∆Median voter non-interpolated
OLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
∆IncomeGrowth -0.22 0.026 -0.42 0.017 -2.68 0.000 -3.00 0.002
IncomeGrowtht−1 -0.28 0.054 -0.43 0.068 -4.37 0.000 -4.02 0.006
Medianvotert−4 -0.33 0.000 -0.32 0.005 -1.83 0.000 -1.96 0.000
Defensespending -0.33 0.050 -0.39 0.417 -3.71 0.000 -4.03 0.002
Inequality 0.13 0.038 0.09 0.288 -0.59 0.063 -0.41 0.187
Turnout 0.01 0.926 0.03 0.802 0.05 0.864
PresidentApproval 0.01 0.384 0.01 0.520 0.10 0.149
Inflation 0.02 0.830 0.07 0.559 -0.21 0.577
Intercept 1.01 0.839 2.85 0.717 95.79 0.001 82.43 0.018
N 58 36 14 14
R-squared 0.58 0.37 0.94 0.97
F statistic 3.72
Note: The 2SLS instruments are the first differences and a one-year lag of dis-
posable income growth rates in the OECD countries minus the US (1970-2008).
There are insufficient observations to run a 2SLS on non-interpolated US median
voter data. Regression coefficients with P-values are presented.
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Table 4.7: Ordinary and 2SLS error correction models on ideological change in
the US (1950-2008).
∆Median voter OLS ∆Median voter 2SLS
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
∆GDPgrowth -0.08 0.241 0.08 0.733
GDPgrowtht−1 -0.20 0.027 -0.84 0.077
∆Unemployment 0.19 0.277 1.05 0.021
Unemploymentt−1 -0.21 0.138 0.06 0.849
∆Inflation -0.16 0.017 -0.33 0.023
Inflationt−1 0.03 0.012 0.02 0.285
Medianvotert−4 -0.27 0.000 -0.29 0.000 -0.33 0.019 -0.26 0.006
Defensespending -0.06 0.485 -0.17 0.132 -0.41 0.509 -0.20 0.650
Inequality 0.22 0.000 -0.16 0.259 0.24 0.009 -0.10 0.621
Intercept -4.53 0.024 8.96 0.085 -1.26 0.803 6.49 0.384
N 58 58 36 37
R-squared 0.56 0.61 0.00 0.48
F statistic 0.97 1.95
Note: Variable definitions are in the appendix. The instrumental variables used
are the first differences and 1-year lags for GDP growth, unemployment, and in-
flation in the OECD countries minus the US (1970-2008). Regression coefficients
with P-values are presented.
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Chapter 5
Personality, Childhood
Experience, and Political
Ideology
5.1 Introduction
Recent research has started to detail the powerful influence that personality
traits exert on political ideology and behaviour [Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak and
Halperin, 2008; Mondak et al., 2010; Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming].
The rise of the “big five” personality traits model in the psychology literature has
made it relatively easier for other disciplines, such as political science, to integrate
measures of personality into applied research. Because of their predictive power
and relative stability throughout the course of life, personality traits merit the
full attention of social and behavioural scientists. In particular, their inclusion
into models of political ideology offers much potential to account for previously
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unexplained variance in ideology. The challenge for political scientists thus far
has been twofold: first, to collect data from samples which also include meaning-
ful covariates for the study of political ideology; and second, to collect samples
large enough to probe beyond direct effects of personality on ideology to explore
the way that personality might interact with known environmental influences on
the development of ideology.
Making use of newly released Add Health Wave IV data [Harris et al., 2009],
which now includes measures for the big five traits, we perform the largest tests
to date on the influence of personality on political ideology. Corroborating initial
findings in political psychology, we find that “openness to experience” strongly
predicts a higher self-reported score on liberal ideology (p≤0.000) and that “con-
scientiousness” strongly predicts a more conservative ideology (p≤0.000).
The scope of the data enables us to make two additional contributions to
the study of political ideology. First, leveraging the family sampling structure in
Add Health, we are able to explore the relationship between personality traits
and political ideology in a new and more robust way. The introduction of fam-
ily fixed effects leads us to discard the significant results on “extraversion” and
“neuroticism” obtained using standard regression analysis, and provides a new
level of robustness to the effects of “openness” and “conscientiousness” on po-
litical ideology. Second, the longitudinal nature of the Add Health data allows
us to explore the effects of various childhood exposures to better understand so-
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cial and environmental contributions to the development of ideology. Work in
behaviour genetics, sociology, and political science suggests that factors related
to childhood experience have profound implications on behaviours and attitudes
later in life [Campbell, 2006; Caspi et al., 2002] that could be related to politi-
cal orientations. Similarly, childhood social experiences have a direct impact on
adult political outcomes [Settle, Bond and Levitt, 2011], but may also interact
with a person’s innate traits to influence their ideology later in life [Settle et al.,
2010]. We interact personality with a variety of childhood experiences and find
that childhood trauma moderates the influence of the “openness to experience”
trait on political ideology.
It is increasingly understood that variation in political ideology is a result
of both the social and environmental experiences throughout the course of life
and the innate predispositions with which individuals are endowed from the start
of life [Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005; Hatemi et al., 2011, 2010]. As such, a
comprehensive understanding of the development of political ideology requires
the consideration of both of these fundamental influences.
5.2 Literature review
The “big five” traits model represents five dimensions or clusters of personality
that jointly describe human personality [Digman, 1990; McCrae and Costa, 1999].
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These five major traits are (i) openness to experience; (ii) conscientiousness; (iii)
extraversion; (iv) agreeableness; and (v) neuroticism. Openness relates to open-
mindedness and the cognitive complexity associated with curiosity, imagination,
and high-risk behaviour. Conscientiousness relates to responsibility, order and
organization, dutifulness, and the self control required to possibly satisfy a need
for achievement. Agreeableness is associated with empathy and a willingness to
compromise in order to foster cooperative interactions. Extraversion is related to
being sociable, lively, and proactively asserting oneself. Neuroticism is viewed as
emotional instability and a tendency to experience negative emotions. A compre-
hensive overview of the big five personality traits is developed elsewhere [Almlund
et al., 2011; Digman, 1990; McCrae and Costa, 1999; Mondak and Halperin, 2008].
Over time, the replication across myriad samples worldwide has led to the broad
acceptance that personality is defined along the lines of these five core traits and
the “big five” model emerged as a dominant model in the psychology literature
[Mondak and Halperin, 2008].
Several important early treaties in political science touched upon the influ-
ence of personality on political behaviours [Adorno et al., 1950; Campbell et al.,
1960; McClosky, 1958] and a handful more addressed the role of personality in
political socialization [Froman, 1961; Greenstein, 1965] but the research agenda
never gained significant momentum. While the role of personality traits on polit-
ical behaviour of the masses was essentially ignored for much of the second half
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of the 20th century, the study of the effects of personality thrived in other disci-
plines. The body of work written by John Jost and colleagues suggests that there
is both a core element to political ideology that is rooted in a person’s under-
lying predispositions [Jost, 2006], and that motivated social cognition reinforces
these tendencies; a variety of psychological variables related to threat and uncer-
tainty have been found to be related to political ideology, including openness to
experience [Jost et al., 2003, 2007].
The first recent developments and small-scale tests of the role of personality in
political behaviour took place in political psychology [Carney et al., 2008; Heil,
Kossowska and Mervielde, 2000; Schoen and Schumann, 2007] and only very
recently did the big five traits receive full consideration by political scientists
[Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Mondak et al., 2010; Verhulst,
Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming]. These studies introduce the big five traits,
suggest a framework for the study of personality and political behaviour across
economic and social policy domains, and investigate the structure of the relation-
ship between genes, personality, and political outcomes. The most powerful and
consistent result to come out of this emerging literature is that individuals that
score high on the “openness” trait are more likely to adopt a liberal ideology,
whereas a high score on the “conscientiousness” trait is associated with more
conservative political attitudes [Gerber et al., 2010].
This more recent work in political science has suggested that in addition to the
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focus on the direct effects of personality on ideology, it is important to consider
the ways in which personality might affect the way we interpret life experiences,
and thus the way our environment affects our ideology. A tentative start has been
made on this exploration. Mondak et al. [2010] explore the role of political net-
work size interacting with personality to affect exposure to disagreement, finding
that extraversion positively interacts with network size to increase cross cutting
exposures while the opposite is true for agreeableness. Digging even further into
innate biological differences that precede personality, Settle et al. [2010] find that
the number of friends in childhood is associated with increased liberalism as a
young adult, but only for those respondents that have one or more alleles of a
gene variant associated with openness to experience, the long allele of DRD4.
Literature from behavioural genetics, psychology, sociology and political sci-
ence suggests a multitude of other contextual effects that may act to mediate or
moderate the effects of personality on political ideology. As Shanahan and Hofer
[2005] note in reference to gene and environmental interactions, the environment
can serve both to trigger or suppress innate tendencies. Notably, scholars have
spent a considerable amount of attention on the idea of childhood experience.
Seminal work in behaviour genetics on the influence of child maltreatment and
life stress [Caspi et al., 2002, 2003] suggests that childhood trauma has the ability
to interact with the innate component of personality and to leave lasting psycho-
logical and behavioural imprints [Sameroff, Lewis and Miller, 2000]. In addition
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to measures of trauma, we also capture other important aspects of the childhood
experience including number of friends and the perception of feeling safe in one’s
school or neighborhood.
5.3 Data and methods
5.3.1 Sample
Data is from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health)
[Harris et al., 2009].1 Add Health was started in 1994 in order to explore the
health-related behaviour of adolescents in grades 7 through 12. By now, 4 waves
of data collection have taken place and participating subjects are around 30 years
old. The first wave of the Add Health study (1994–1995) selected 80 high schools
from a sampling frame of 26,666. The schools were selected based on their size,
school type, census region, level of urbanization, and percent of the population
that was white. Participating high schools were asked to identify junior high
or middle schools that served as feeder schools to their school. This resulted
in the participation of 145 middle, junior high, and high schools. From those
schools, 90,118 students completed a 45-minute questionnaire and each school was
1This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan
Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with
cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. No direct support was
received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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asked to complete at least one School Administrator questionnaire. This process
generated descriptive information about each student, the educational setting,
and the environment of the school. From these respondents, a core random
sample of 12,105 adolescents in grades 7-12 were drawn plus several over-samples,
totaling more than 27,000 adolescents. These students and their parents were
administered in-home surveys in the first wave. Wave II (1996) was comprised of
another set of in-home interviews of more than 14,738 students from the Wave
I sample and a follow-up telephone survey of the school administrators. Wave
III (2001–2002) consisted of an in-home interview of 15,170 Wave I participants.
Finally, Wave IV (2008) consisted of an in-home interview of 15,701 Wave I
participants. The result of this sampling design is that Add Health is a nationally
representative study. Women make up 49% of the study’s participants, Hispanics
12.2%, Blacks 16.0%, Asians 3.3%, and Native Americans 2.2%. Participants in
Add Health also represent all regions of the United States.
In Wave IV only, subjects were asked a battery of questions to gauge their
position on the “big five” personality traits. The specific questions and their
descriptive statistics are given in Tables 7–8 in the Appendix. Participants were
also asked in Wave IV about their political ideology on the general conservative-
liberal scale. In the first three waves of the study, respondents were asked ques-
tions about a variety of experiences related to childhood experiences and contexts.
Alternative answers to these questions, such as “refused” or “don’t know,” were
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discarded for the purpose of this study (typically less than 1% of interviewees gave
such a response). Details on these questions are also available in the Appendix.
In Wave I of the Add Health study, researchers screened for sibling pairs
including all adolescents that were identified as twin pairs, full-siblings, half-
siblings, or unrelated siblings raised together. The sibling-pairs sample is similar
in demographic composition to the full Add Health sample [Jacobson and Rowe,
1998]. Consequently, in all regression models we cluster the standard errors of our
estimates in order to better account for the fact that a subset of our observations
are not independent. The structure of this data also allows us to compare siblings
to each other while holding the family environment constant, which aids our
causal interpretation of the relationship between personality, childhood context,
and political ideology as an adult.
5.3.2 Methods
The analysis proceeds in four parts. First, we check the direct effects of personal-
ity on political ideology. We have strong expectations from previous work about
the direction and significance of each trait on ideology but the large sample size
and the available sibling clusters allow us to be more precise in our estimates than
previous work. Second, we seek to measure the direct effects of various childhood
experiences on political ideology as an adult. Next, we hypothesize that childhood
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factors may be more strongly related to political ideology for people of some per-
sonality types than others. As such, we present results for analyses that include
interaction terms for personality and childhood experience variables. Finally, we
extend on the significant interaction effect that we find between childhood trauma
and openness to experience using Sobel-Goodman mediation analyses in order to
better understand the nature of the relationship between these two contributing
factors to ideology.
All models employ ordered probit regressions on a five-point scale of politi-
cal ideology, where “very liberal” receives a score of “5”. A variety of controls
plausibly related to political ideology are incorporated into the models, includ-
ing age, gender, race, log of income, and education level. In models looking at
the childhood experience variables we include an additional control variable for
whether or not food stamps were allocated in that period, because the household
socio-economic status of the childhood upbringing may bias childhood experi-
ence (about 24% of our participants recall being the recipient, or others in their
household, of public assistance such as food stamps).
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Direct effects of personality on ideology
Based on previous work on the role of personality on ideology, we expect the open-
ness and conscientiousness traits to be strongly associated with political ideology.
Especially in the United States, liberalism is conceived of embracing change and
pro-active policies, whereas conservatism is likened to personal responsibility, cau-
tion, and maintaining order [Mondak and Halperin, 2008]. Our results align with
our expectations. Figure 5.1 visualizes the marginal effects on ideology of each
personality trait based on the ordered probit regression analysis reported in Table
5.1. Corroborating and extending the initial findings in political psychology, we
find that “openness to experience” strongly predicts a higher self-reported score
on liberal ideology (p≤0.000) and that “conscientiousness” strongly predicts a
more conservative ideology (p≤0.000). Each personality trait is measured on a
scale from 4 to 20. To illustrate the strength of the effects, consider increasing the
“openness to experience” trait of an individual from a score of 12 (20th percentile)
to a score of 16 (80th percentile); keeping all else constant, this would increase the
likelihood of this person self-reporting to be very liberal by approximately 71%.
Significant effects are also obtained for “neuroticism” (p≤0.000) and “extraver-
sion” (p≤0.000) being positively associated with liberal ideology. Agreeableness
(p=0.277) does not produce a significant effect on overall political ideology but
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this may be due to separate and contradicting tendencies on economic and so-
cial policies that are not captured on the aggregate conservative-liberal spectrum
used here [Gerber et al., 2010; Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming].
Table 5.1: Ordered probit model of political ideology on the “big five” personality
traits
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Openness 0.065 0.002 0.000
Conscientiousness -0.036 0.002 0.000
Extraversion 0.009 0.002 0.000
Agreeableness 0.003 0.003 0.277
Neuroticism 0.015 0.002 0.000
Age -0.019 0.003 0.000
Male -0.161 0.012 0.000
Black 0.084 0.020 0.000
Hispanic 0.101 0.073 0.000
Asian 0.075 0.081 0.351
Income (log) 0.015 0.002 0.000
Education 0.035 0.003 0.000
Intercept 2.759 0.294 0.000
N 13,999
PseudoR2 0.019
Note: Ordered probit model of political ideology (1 = very conservative to 5 =
very liberal) on the “big five” personality traits and control variables. Descriptive
statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (SE) and P-values are
also presented.
Next, we leverage the sibling clusters in the Add Health data to compare
siblings to each other by performing a type of matching procedure, in which we
are controlling for the family environment. First, we construct an overall mean
value for each of the personality traits of all the siblings within each family,
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Figure 5.1: Marginal effects of the “big five” personality traits on political ideol-
ogy
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Note: Variation in the “big five” personality traits is associated with significant
changes in political ideology. Marginal effects are presented, based on simulations
of Table 5.1 model regression parameters, along with 95% confidence intervals.
For each personality trait, all other traits and variables are held at their means.
Outcome is set as the “very liberal” category. Change in outcome is based on a
one standard deviation increase from the mean in the respective personality trait.
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and then calculate the difference between every individual’s trait score and their
family mean. This leads us to have two measures of variation in personality
traits—that between families and that within families. By using the variation
in within-family traits, we can test whether respondents who are, for example,
more open than their siblings are also more likely to report being liberal. This
family-based method specifies a variance-components based association analysis
for sibling pairs and was first suggested in the behavioural genetics literature by
Boehnke and Langefeld [1998] and Spielman and Ewens [1998]. By decomposing
personality trait scores into between-family (b) and within-family (w) compo-
nents it is possible to control for spurious results due to population stratification
because only the coefficient on the between-family variance (βb) will be affected
by covariates such as the socio-economic status, race, and localization of the fam-
ily. The association result is determined by the coefficient on the within-family
variance (βw) which, in essence, shows whether variation in personality traits
among siblings may be significantly associated with differences in political ideol-
ogy between siblings. The following regression model is employed to perform this
family-based association test:
Yij = β0 + βwTwij + βbTbj + βkZkij + Uj + ij
where i and j index subject and family respectively. Tw is the within-family
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variance component of the individual’s personality traits (measured as subject
trait minus their family’s mean trait score), Tb is the between-family variance
component of the individual’s traits (measured as their family’s mean genotype
score). Zk is a matrix of variables to control for individual sibling differences
(age, gender, income, education), U is a family random effect that controls for
potential genetic and environmental correlation among family members, and  is
an individual-specific error.
Family-based designs eliminate the problem of population stratification by
using family members, such as siblings, as controls. While a family-based design is
very powerful in minimizing Type I error (false positives) due to omitted variable
bias, it reduces the power to detect true associations, and is thus more prone
to Type II error or false negatives [Xu and Shete, 2006]. Of course, when data
for siblings are available—as is the case in Add Health—then a family-based test
produces the more robust results.
Table 5.2 reports the results of our family-based model for the influence of
the big 5 personality traits on political ideology. The prior findings on openness
to experience and conscientiousness are robust to this model specification. We
find that respondents who are more open than their siblings are more likely to
report being liberal-minded and respondents that are more conscientious than
their siblings are more likely to report being conservative-minded. The prior
results on extraversion and neuroticism do not survive the family-based model
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specification and drop their statistical significance.
Table 5.2: Ordered probit model of political ideology on the “big five” personality
traits decomposed into within and between family variance components
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Openness: within-family variance 0.019 0.008 0.031
Openness: between-family variance 0.079 0.011 0.000
Conscientiousness: within-family variance -0.029 0.008 0.001
Conscientiousness: between-family variance -0.036 0.010 0.000
Extraversion: within-family variance 0.009 0.008 0.270
Extraversion: between-family variance 0.011 0.009 0.212
Agreeableness: within-family variance 0.018 0.011 0.114
Agreeableness: between-family variance -0.003 0.012 0.792
Neuroticism: within-family variance 0.008 0.008 0.296
Neuroticism: between-family variance 0.022 0.010 0.022
Age -0.013 0.009 0.156
Male -0.172 0.038 0.000
Income (log) 0.020 0.006 0.002
Education 0.025 0.009 0.006
Intercept 2.226 0.398 0.000
N 3,967
PseudoR2 0.018
Note: Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (SE)
and P-values are also presented.
5.4.2 Direct effects of childhood experience on ideology
We next consider a variety of childhood experiences that may affect political
ideology later in life. The wording and distributions for each of the childhood
variables can be found in the Appendix. These childhood variables are first
considered in isolation using each in a separate regression, and then we consider
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them jointly.
First, we consider childhood trauma. We measure childhood trauma by load-
ing the three available questions on child maltreatment into an index. These
questions gauge verbal, physical, and sexual abuse in childhood. We report that
about half of our sample population has experienced some level of maltreatment
by a parent or adult caregiver before the age of 18. For the precise questions and
descriptive statistics please refer to the Appendix. We do not have an ex-ante
hypothesis about the direction of a possible effect but do anticipate that the last-
ing psychological and behavioural consequences of childhood trauma may have a
powerful influence on ideology.
Next, we consider the broader context in which a respondent was raised, and
whether they felt safe in their school and neighborhood. We hypothesize that
these experiences will be less salient to an individual than trauma in the home,
but an adolescent’s early orientation toward their community has been shown to
affect other political attitudes and behaviours [Settle et al., 2010].
Finally, less traumatic experiences can also serve to shape a person’s world
view and thus their political ideology. A large body of work demonstrates that the
attitudinal composition of friendships influence our political preferences [Huck-
feldt, Johnson and Sprague, 2002, 2004; Mutz, 2002; Parsons, 2009]. For some
people, friendship itself may activate certain ideological positions [Settle et al.,
2010] and the attitudes of the network in which one is embedded in high school
130
affect later political behaviour [Settle, Bond and Levitt, 2011]. We therefore also
consider the total number of friends that the individual has named—or is being
named by—in Wave I of the Add Health data collection.
Table 5.3 shows the coefficients of these four variables and Figure 5.2 shows
the simulated marginal effects with their confidence intervals. These traumatic,
neighborhood, and social aspects of childhood all obtain significant main effects
on political ideology later in life. Consistent with the small literature that exists
on the topic [Campbell, 2006; Lay, Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2003], these results
suggest that childhood experience matters for the way the political world is viewed
as adults. To understand the relative effect of these childhood experiences in
relation to each other, we combine them in a single regression. The results of this
combined model are shown in Table 5.10 in Appendix. Childhood trauma and
number of friends continue to come in significantly. However, the collinearity of
the school and neighborhood insecurity measures weakens their individual effects
in a joint analysis.
The interpretation of these direct effects of childhood experience on political
ideology falls outside the scope if this paper but merits further research and
discussion. A tentative logic would be that the experience of childhood trauma,
as well as school and neighborhood insecurity, may instill a heightened sense of
vulnerability in individuals. In turn, a sense of individual vulnerability is likely
to incline people to political views that favor social programs and government
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Figure 5.2: Marginal effects of the childhood experience variables on political
ideology
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Note: Variation in the childhood experience variables is associated with signifi-
cant changes in political ideology. Marginal effects are presented, based on sim-
ulations of model regression parameters (Table 5.3), along with 95% confidence
intervals. For each indicator, all other variables are held at their means. Out-
come is set as the “very liberal” category. Change in outcome is based on a one
standard deviation increase from the mean in the respective childhood indicator.
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Table 5.3: Ordered probit models of political ideology on childhood environment
variables (independently)
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value N R2
Childhood trauma 0.076 0.007 0.000 13,799 0.01
Neighborhood insecurity 0.032 0.006 0.000 9,526 0.01
School insecurity 0.035 0.017 0.034 9,519 0.01
Number of friends -0.007 0.001 0.000 9,993 0.01
Note: Ordered probit models of political ideology (1 = very conservative to 5 =
very liberal) on the childhood environment variables. Coefficients are presented
for regressions that considered these childhood variables separately controlling for
gender, race, education, log of income, and whether food stamps were distributed
in the childhood household. A full model that includes all childhood variables is
given in Appendix. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Stan-
dard errors (SE), P-values, Number of observations, and the R-squared are also
presented.
intervention if a need arises. We also speculate that individuals who suffered
childhood maltreatment will be wary of authority and order, while the added
complexity of dealing with negative childhood emotions may draw them to a
greater variety of experiences and show less impulse control. Such psychological
and behavioural consequences of childhood trauma may further distance these
individuals from conservative principles.
5.4.3 Interaction effects of childhood experience and per-
sonality on ideology
As noted in the literature review, scholars theorize that much of the influence
of personality on political ideology may be related to the way that personality
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moderates the interpretation of the environmental influences around us. To ad-
dress this question, we interact the childhood environment variables with the five
personality traits and estimate their effect on ideology.
Only one interaction is significant; the remaining models suggest that the in-
fluence of personality and these contextual variables are additive in nature. When
interacting the personality traits with childhood trauma in an ordered probit re-
gression we find that childhood trauma intensifies the effect of the “openness
to experience” trait on liberal political ideology as we move up in categories of
openness. The interaction term for openness x childhood trauma in the regression
analysis produces a positive and significant coefficient (p=0.002, see Table 5.4).
In short, the openness trait appears even more predictive of ideology for abused
people than for others. This is most strongly the case for individuals that report
having experienced all three levels of abuse: verbal, physical, and sexual.
Figure 5.3 plots the regression output on the political ideology scale for each
category of the openness trait, split between the varying degrees of childhood
trauma. We note that childhood trauma intensifies the effect of openness on
ideology. Figure 5.3 illustrates the positive association between “openness to ex-
perience” and liberal political ideology, as well as the interaction effect of openness
and childhood trauma. Given the novelty of this finding we further explore the
relationship between childhood trauma and political ideology in the next section.
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Table 5.4: Ordered probit model of political ideology on the “big five” personality
traits, childhood trauma, and interaction terms
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Openness 0.059 0.003 0.000
Conscientiousness -0.038 0.003 0.000
Extraversion 0.009 0.003 0.005
Agreeableness 0.005 0.005 0.333
Neuroticism 0.008 0.003 0.011
Childhood trauma -0.118 0.120 0.325
Openness x trauma 0.009 0.003 0.002
Conscientiousness x trauma 0.003 0.002 0.172
Extraversion x trauma 0.001 0.003 0.659
Agreeableness x trauma -0.004 0.005 0.483
Neuroticism x trauma 0.002 0.004 0.573
Age -0.016 0.003 0.000
Male -0.173 0.012 0.000
Black 0.075 0.023 0.001
Hispanic 0.101 0.022 0.000
Asian 0.168 0.026 0.000
Income (log) -0.012 0.007 0.072
Education 0.037 0.003 0.000
Food stamps -0.054 0.022 0.015
Intercept 2.515 0.368 0.000
N 12,852
PseudoR2 0.020
Note: Ordered probit model of political ideology (1 = v. conservative to 5 = v.
liberal) on the “big five” personality traits, childhood trauma, their interaction
terms, and control variables. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.
Standard errors (SE) and P-values are also presented.
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Figure 5.3: Interaction plot of childhood trauma and the “openness” personality
trait on political ideology
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Note: Childhood trauma interacts with the “openness” personality trait to in-
fluence political ideology. Regression output for political ideology (1 = very
conservative; 5 = very liberal) is plotted for each category of the openness trait,
split between the varying degrees of childhood trauma. To obtain this figure, a
linear regression instead of an ordered probit analysis is applied on the model
specified in Table 5.4. For variable details please refer to the Appendix.
136
5.4.4 Exploring the relationship between openness to ex-
perience, childhood trauma, and liberal ideology
In the previous section we established that there exists a significant interaction
between childhood trauma and openness on liberal ideology, in addition to the di-
rect positive effects reported earlier. What we capture in a statistical interaction,
however, represents a potentially complicated relationship. It is possible that
childhood trauma (measured as an index of verbal, physical, and sexual abuse)
is independent of the personality trait, and that we are measuring a true interac-
tion. But it is also possible that children who are more open may be more likely
to be victims of trauma because of a propensity to engage in behaviours that may
elicit maltreatment by their parents. We next seek to gain some leverage on this
question.
First, we look more closely at the relationship between openness to experience
and childhood maltreatment. The openness trait is positively associated with
such traumatic experience (χ2=94, p≤0.000). Because of the timing in which the
variables are measured, it is impossible to determine if being open makes a child
more likely to be a victim of abuse, or if being a victim of abuse makes a child
more likely to be open, but it is clear that the two variables are not independent
of each other.
This suggests an analogous situation to the evocative gene-environment inter-
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action described by Scarr and McCartney [1983]. Being open may lead adoles-
cents to have an increased likelihood of being the victim of maltreatment, which
then reinforces the natural tendency of open people to report being politically
liberal. Thus, the relationship is not a true interaction in the sense that trauma is
an exogenous occurrence, but it does amplify an open person’s natural tendency
toward being liberal. People who are open are more likely to be liberal than are
people who are not, and people who are traumatized are more likely to be liberal
than are people who are not traumatized.
In order to get a better sense for the influence that the openness trait and
childhood trauma variables may have on each other’s respective influence on
liberal political ideology we perform Sobel-Goodman mediation tests. Both in-
dependent variables could be considered a mediator for one another if they carry
some part of the influence that each has on political ideology. Following the text-
book approach to mediation analysis [Stata, 2011], mediation would occur in our
case when (1) the independent variable (IV) significantly affects the mediator,
(2) the IV significantly affects political ideology in the absence of the mediator,
(3) the mediator has a significant unique effect on political ideology, and (4) the
effect of the IV on political ideology shrinks upon the addition of the mediator to
the model. We run Sobel-Goodman mediation tests for both childhood trauma
as mediator (Table 5) and openness to experience as mediator (Table 6). We also
bootstrap (200 replications) to generate percentile and bias-corrected confidence
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intervals.
The results of our Sobel-Goodman mediation tests show that both trauma and
openness are significant mediators for each others’ influence on political ideology.
However, the mediating force that openness has is about ten times the size of the
mediating force of childhood trauma. This indicates that openness carries much
more of the traumatic influence across to political ideology than vice versa. This
leads us to consider the openness to experience trait as the dominating influence
in this complex relationship. This aligns with recent work in behavioural genetics
that shows that the big five personality traits are to a large extent innate with
heritability estimates ranging around 50% [Verhulst, Hatemi and Eaves, 2009;
Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming]. This understanding that personality
traits are developed mostly prior to environmental influences is also acknowledged
in recent important contributions to the literature on the influence of personality
on political ideology and behaviour [Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak et al., 2010].
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Table 5.5: Sobel-Goodman mediation tests for political ideology on the openness
to experience trait mediated by childhood trauma
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests: Liberal (DV), Openness (IV), Trauma (MV)
Coeff. SE Z P-value
Sobel 0.0008 0.0002 3.975 0.000
Goodman-1 0.0008 0.0002 3.944 0.000
Goodman-2 0.0008 0.0002 4.007 0.000
Proportion of total effect that is mediated: 1.4%
Percentile and Bias-corrected bootstrap results for Sobel (200 replications):
Coefficient: 0.0008
Percentile 95% confidence interval: 0.0004 – 0.0012
Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: 0.0005 – 0.0013
Note: Sobel-Goodman mediation tests for political ideology (1 = very conserva-
tive to 5 = very liberal) on the openness to experience trait mediated by child-
hood trauma. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard
errors (SE) and Z and P-values are also presented.
Table 5.6: Sobel-Goodman mediation tests for political ideology on childhood
trauma mediated by the openness to experience trait
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Tests: Liberal (DV), Trauma (IV), Openness (MV)
Coeff. SE Z P-value
Sobel 0.008 0.002 5.334 0.000
Goodman-1 0.008 0.002 5.327 0.000
Goodman-2 0.008 0.002 5.341 0.000
Proportion of total effect that is mediated: 13.1%
Percentile and Bias-corrected bootstrap results for Sobel (200 replications):
Coefficient: 0.008
Percentile 95% confidence interval: 0.005 – 0.011
Bias-corrected 95% confidence interval: 0.005 – 0.011
Note: Sobel-Goodman mediation tests for political ideology (1 = very conser-
vative to 5 = very liberal) on childhood trauma mediated by the openness to
experience trait. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard
errors (SE) and Z and P-values are also presented.
140
5.5 Discussion
A growing body of evidence suggests that there are inherent differences between
people that affect their political ideology and behaviour [Alford, Funk and Hib-
bing, 2005; Fowler, Baker and Dawes, 2008; Hatemi et al., 2011, 2010; Oxley et al.,
2008; Settle et al., 2010; Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming]. Simultane-
ously, there has been a call to more deeply consider the theory behind why these
individual differences should matter as well as to consider how the mechanisms
might operate. For the study of the relationship between personality and ide-
ology, this means developing stronger theories which explain how the particular
components of the personality trait should influence political thinking and how
it could make people differentially responsive to the environmental exposures we
know also affect the development of ideology.
The most recent release of the Add Health data gives us a unique opportu-
nity to explore how the “big five” personality traits and contextual influences
directly affect political ideology, as well as the way in which personality traits
may make people differentially responsive to aspects of their environment that
shape political beliefs. The longitudinal nature of the study suits it especially
well to examine how innate differences like personality interact with a variety of
life course events in childhood, adolescence and early adulthood. The richness
of data on respondent life history is perhaps unmatched in the standard studies
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used in political science.
Despite the richness of the data in certain regards, we want to make clear
three limitations of the data. First, the Add Health sample is restricted to indi-
viduals who are about 30 years old, though the distribution of answers is typical
of other political ideology and personality surveys and may suggest some degree
of generalizability. The age limitation is unlikely to substantially distort our re-
sults, but should be acknowledged. Second, recent work has noted that using the
standard liberal-conservative ideological spectrum does not allow for more precise
relationships between personality and, for example, social and economic policy
dimensions [Gerber et al., 2010; Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin, forthcoming]. This
may explain why the agreeableness trait does not appear to be associated with
overall political ideology but does influence more specific political attitudes [Ger-
ber et al., 2010]. Finally, the personality measures are collected in Wave IV in
early adulthood simultaneously with the political ideology measures. While per-
sonality has been shown to be relatively stable over the life course [Costa and
McCrae, 1988; Soldz and Vaillant, 1999], we are measuring personality after the
exposure to the childhood context. This makes it difficult to disentangle whether
the personality factors are entirely independent of the specific contexts measured,
contribute to the contextual exposure, or are in part a product of the contextual
exposure. Our usage of the family-structure of the data and the mediation anal-
yses helps disentangle this relationship, but it must be clear that we cannot fully
142
do so.
The study of political ideology and behaviour has benefitted greatly from in-
corporating a broader notion of what contributes to the development of political
attitudes, including factors derived both from our genes and from our environ-
ments. The findings of this study provide new evidence for the idea that differ-
ences in political ideology are deeply intertwined with variation in the nature and
nurture of individual personalities.
143
5.6 Appendix
Questions and variable components
Political ideology
In terms of politics, do you consider yourself very conservative, conservative,
middle-of-the-road, liberal, or very liberal? (1=v. conservative to 5=v. liberal)
Personality traits:
Additive indices for the “big 5” personality traits by loading their 4 component
questions.
Openness
(1) I have a vivid imagination (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)
(2) I am not interested in abstract ideas (reversed)
(3) I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas (reversed)
(4) I do not have a good imagination (reversed)
Conscientiousness
(1) I get chores done right away
(2) I often forget to put things back in their proper place (reversed)
(3) I like order
(4) I make a mess of things (reversed)
Extraversion
(1) I am the life of the party
(2) I don’t talk a lot (reversed)
(3) I talk to a lot of different people at parties
(4) I keep in the background (reversed)
Agreeableness
(1) I sympathize with others’ feelings
(2) I am not interested in other people’s problems (reversed)
(3) I feel others’ emotions
(4) I am not really interested in others (reversed)
Neuroticism
(1) I have frequent mood swings
(2) I am relaxed most of the time (reversed)
(3) I get upset easily
(4) I seldom feel blue (reversed)
Childhood trauma
An index that takes the value of 0, 1, 2, or 3 by considering the following three
questions on verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. Each non-zero answer to these
questions is added as a single point to the childhood trauma variable index.
(1) Before your 18th birthday, how often did a parent or other adult caregiver
say things that really hurt your feelings or made you feel like you were not
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Table 5.7 – continued from previous page
Questions and variable components
wanted or loved? (from 0=“this has never happened” to 5=“more than ten times”)
(2) Before your 18th birthday, how often did a parent or adult caregiver hit you
with a fist, kick you, or throw you down on the floor, into a wall, or down stairs?
(3) How often did a parent or other adult caregiver touch you in a sexual way,
force you to touch him or her in a sexual way, or force you to have sexual relations?
Neighborhood insecurity
I feel safe in my neighborhood (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree;
asked in Wave I, 1994-95)
School insecurity
I feel safe in my neighborhood (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree;
asked in Wave I, 1994-95)
Number of friends
Individuals were asked about their social network in the in-school survey as
part of Wave I. They were allowed to nominate up to five female and five
male friends. This measure adds the number of friends that were named as
well as the number of times the respondent was named as a friend.
Table 5.7: Survey questions and variable components.
145
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Political ideology 3.04 0.93 1 5
Openness 14.50 2.45 4 20
Conscientiousness 14.64 2.70 4 20
Extraversion 13.22 3.06 4 20
Agreeableness 15.24 2.41 4 20
Neuroticism 10.45 2.74 4 20
Childhood trauma 0.71 0.82 0 3
Neighborhood insecurity 2.04 1.07 1 5
School insecurity 2.32 1.20 0 5
Number of friends 7.23 4.67 1 37
Age 29.15 1.74 25 34
Male 0.49 0.50 0 1
White 0.71 0.49 0 1
Black 0.19 0.41 0 1
Hispanic 0.17 0.38 0 1
Asian 0.08 0.27 0 1
Income 34,632 38,284 0 920,000
Education 5.67 2.20 1 13
Food stamps 0.24 0.43 0 1
Table 5.8: Sample means.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Political ideology 1
(2) Childhood trauma 0.07 1
(3) Openness 0.15 0.08 1
(4) Conscientiousness -0.07 -0.07 0.04 1
(5) Extraversion 0.05 0.02 0.22 0.09 1
(6) Agreeableness 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.16 0.27 1
(7) Neuroticism 0.02 0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 1
Table 5.9: Correlation table between political ideology, childhood trauma, and
personality traits.
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Table 5.10: Ordered probit model of political ideology on the childhood environ-
ment variables (jointly)
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Childhood trauma 0.076 0.012 0.000
Neighborhood insecurity 0.034 0.022 0.116
School insecurity 0.004 0.011 0.714
Number of friends -0.006 0.002 0.000
Age -0.034 0.004 0.000
Male -0.101 0.014 0.000
Black 0.073 0.023 0.001
Hispanic 0.096 0.036 0.008
Asian 0.167 0.028 0.000
Income (log) 0.019 0.003 0.000
Education 0.061 0.004 0.000
Food stamps -0.039 0.030 0.202
Intercept 3.192 0.412 0.000
N 7,642
PseudoR2 0.012
Note: Ordered probit model of political ideology (1 = very conservative to 5 =
very liberal) on childhood environment indicators and control variables. Descrip-
tive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (SE) and P-values
are also presented.
147
Table 5.11: Cross-tabs for ideology and the “openness to experience” personality
trait
Political ideology
Openness v. cons. conservative middle liberal v. liberal Total
4 1 1 0 0 0 2
5 1 0 5 0 1 7
6 0 3 5 1 0 9
7 6 11 5 1 2 25
8 12 27 45 21 6 111
9 9 53 67 27 9 165
10 29 109 196 57 19 410
11 46 151 308 112 39 656
12 99 369 789 250 80 1,587
13 70 405 906 296 77 1,754
14 121 539 1,228 494 105 2,487
15 81 452 972 460 88 2,053
16 84 490 1,123 671 155 2,523
17 47 209 500 323 110 1,189
18 31 146 338 223 83 821
19 19 65 149 134 65 432
20 16 43 137 120 81 397
Total 672 3,073 6,773 3,190 920 14,628
Pearson chi-squared = 642.6; Pr = 0.000
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Table 5.12: Cross-tabs for ideology and the “conscientiousness” personality trait
Political ideology
Conscientiousness v. cons. conservative middle liberal v. liberal Total
4 0 1 1 1 0 3
5 1 0 5 6 3 15
6 3 2 18 7 5 35
7 0 10 25 16 8 59
8 6 29 71 46 23 175
9 5 38 103 68 20 234
10 20 85 220 132 40 497
11 25 122 344 165 56 712
12 66 235 639 303 110 1,353
13 60 286 669 291 104 1,410
14 108 468 991 438 119 2,124
15 95 397 954 436 116 1,998
16 92 636 1,243 599 128 2,698
17 67 322 612 288 70 1,359
18 46 213 411 185 49 904
19 40 151 283 140 33 647
20 42 97 209 88 42 478
Total 676 3,092 6,798 3,302 926 14,701
Pearson chi-squared = 187.9; Pr = 0.000
Table 5.13: Cross-tabs for ideology and childhood trauma
Political ideology
Childhood trauma v. cons. conservative middle liberal v. liberal Total
0 354 1,630 3,289 1,414 406 7,093
1 194 931 2,224 1,123 327 4,799
2 82 424 1,010 534 150 2,200
3 23 65 155 87 25 355
Total 653 3,050 6,678 3,158 908 14,447
Pearson chi-squared = 67.05; Pr = 0.000
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Table 5.14: Ordered probit model of political ideology on childhood trauma
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Childhood trauma 0.076 0.007 0.000
Age -0.026 0.003 0.000
Male -0.110 0.010 0.000
Black 0.083 0.022 0.003
Hispanic 0.091 0.021 0.000
Asian 0.140 0.024 0.000
Income (log) 0.015 0.002 0.000
Education 0.045 0.003 0.000
Food stamps -0.024 0.021 0.261
Intercept 3.22 0.251 0.000
N 13,799
PseudoR2 0.008
Note: Ordered probit model of political ideology (1 = v. conservative to 5 =
v. liberal) on childhood trauma and control variables. Descriptive statistics are
provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (SE) and P-values are also presented.
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Table 5.15: Ordered probit model of political ideology on the “big five” person-
ality traits and childhood trauma
Political ideology
Coeff. SE P-value
Openness 0.064 0.002 0.000
Conscientiousness -0.036 0.002 0.000
Extraversion -0.009 0.002 0.000
Agreeableness 0.002 0.003 0.451
Neuroticism 0.012 0.002 0.000
Childhood trauma 0.048 0.007 0.000
Age -0.019 0.003 0.000
Male -0.161 0.011 0.000
Black 0.091 0.022 0.000
Hispanic 0.097 0.023 0.000
Asian 0.169 0.024 0.000
Income (log) 0.015 0.002 0.000
Education 0.035 0.003 0.000
Food stamps -0.036 0.021 0.096
Intercept 2.582 0.298 0.000
N 13,770
PseudoR2 0.019
Note: Ordered probit model of political ideology (1 = v. conservative to 5 =
v. liberal) on the “big five” personality traits, childhood trauma, and control
variables. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors
(SE) and P-values are also presented.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The preceding chapters each provide a perspective into the formation of politi-
cal preferences and, ultimately, voting behaviour. These separate inquiries into
how institutions, economic conditions, and personality may influence political
preferences do not represent a definitive account of political preference forma-
tion. Rather, they explore data and empirical models and intend to contribute
to their respective literatures. The results of these analyses show that the indi-
vidual effects of these three influences are particularly strong and hold significant
predictive power of political preferences. In a general model of political prefer-
ence formation, the inclusion of institutions, economic conditions, and personality
would likely see these variables play a prominent role.
Ideally, data collection in political science and political economy would allow
for a full integration of potential influences such as genomic information, per-
sonality profiles, socio-economic influences throughout the life course, economic
conditions, and institutions. A comprehensive multi-level panel data model would
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also allow for mediation analyses to tease out the individual strength and sequen-
tial role of each predictor. In the absence of fully integrated data, we are limited
to considering the effects of these influences separately. This may, however, lead
scholars to consider these effects as additive. But some of these influences on po-
litical preference formation may not be independent of each other. For example,
institutional variation may influence economic performance [Hall and Gingerich,
2009]; or evolutionary drift could result in varying population genetics and, in
turn, influence institutional preferences. This latter reasoning is developed by
Chiao and Blizinsky [2009] who report on an association between the global dis-
tribution of a particular genotype variant and the presence of collectivist insti-
tutions. If this result on culture-gene coevolution stands, than the institutional
framework of a society is not independent from its population genetics. Such
new research avenues provide exciting opportunities for better understanding our
political economy but also raise methodological challenges to current scholarship.
Bearing these—and other necessary caveats—in mind, this thesis makes a
number of individual contributions. Chapter 2 introduced a median voter data
set that allows for comparing the ideological position of the electoral center across
time and across countries. The data set employs the statistics provided by the
Comparative Manifesto Project but corrects for stochastic error using work by
Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov [2009] and includes standard errors. This research
applies the Kim and Fording [1998] methodology that links party positions with
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electoral outcomes to arrive at revealed voter preferences for a large number of
democracies. Building on these new data, Chapter 3 found that political prefer-
ences are closely related to the salience of particular economic institutions: labour
organization, skill specificity, and public sector employment. At the country level,
this chapter thus suggested that coordinated market economies move the median
voter to the left, whereas liberal market economies move the median voter to
the right. Instrumented statistical analyses showed that revealed voter prefer-
ences are endogenous to the economic institutions of the political economy. This
chapter placed institutions at the heart of voting behaviour and also implies the
existence of institutional advantages to partisan politics.
Building on the new US median voter data, Chapter 4 tested the proposition
that voters advance a more liberal agenda in prosperous times and shift towards
being more conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility
model related economic conditions over time to voting behaviour by way of the
demand for public goods and the optimal tax rate. With income growth, the
relative demand for public goods increases and the median voter can afford more
taxation, as a result the median voter is more likely to vote Democrat. With
less income growth, the median voter derives increased marginal utility from
personal income—making taxation more painful—and is thus more likely to vote
Republican. This chapter linked political preferences to economic business cycles
and showed that ideological change is endogenous to economic conditions.
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Finally, Chapter 5 turned to individual level observations and presented the
largest study to date on the influence of the “big five” personality traits on po-
litical preferences. In line with research in political psychology, it was found
that “openness to experience” strongly predicts liberal ideology and that “con-
scientiousness” strongly predicts conservative ideology. The availability of sibling
clusters in the data was leveraged to show that these results are also robust to
the inclusion of family fixed effects. A variety of childhood experiences were also
studied and childhood trauma was found to interact with “openness” in predict-
ing ideology. A further exploration of this triangular relationship using mediation
analysis indicated that the openness trait was, in fact, the preeminent influence
underlying this relationship. The findings of this chapter provided new evidence
for the idea that differences in political preferences are deeply intertwined with
variation in the nature and nurture of individual personalities.
Each chapter represented a distinct contribution and provided a different per-
spective on the formation of political preferences. These different approaches
related to the fields of comparative political economy, behavioural economics,
and political psychology. Taken together, these perspectives provided some new
insights into the complex world of political preference formation and did so by
exploring the important role of institutions, economic conditions, and personality.
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